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Punishing Risk
ERIN COLLINS*
Actuarial recidivism risk assessments-statistical predictions of the
likelihood of future criminal behavior-drive a number of core criminal
justice decisions, including where to police, whom to release on bail, and
how to manage correctional institutions. Recently, this predictive
approach to criminal justice entered a new arena: sentencing. Actuarial
sentencing has quickly gained a number of prominent supporters and is
being implemented across the country. This enthusiasm is understand-
able. Its proponents promise that actuarial data will refine sentencing
decisions, increase rehabilitation, and reduce reliance on incarceration.
Yet, in the rush to embrace actuarial sentencing, scholars and policy
makers have overlooked a crucial point: actuarial risk assessment tools
are not intended for use at sentencing. In fact, their creators explicitly
warn that these tools were not designed to aid decisions about the length
of a sentence or whether to incarcerate someone. Nevertheless, that is
precisely how those who endorse actuarial sentencing-including the
American Law Institute in the recently revised Model Penal Code for
Sentencing-suggest they should be used.
Actuarial sentencing is, in short, an unintended, "off-label" applica-
tion of actuarial risk information. This Article reexamines the promises of
actuarial sentencing in light of this observation and argues that it may
cause a number of equally unintended and detrimental consequences.
Specifically, it contends that this practice distorts, rather than refines, sen-
tencing decisions. Moreover, it may increase reliance on incarceration-
and it may do so for reasons that undermine the fairness and integrity of
the criminal justice system.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .......................................................... 58
I. THE RISE OF ACTUARIAL SENTENCING ................................ 63
A. THE PRACTICE OF ACTUARIAL SENTENCING ....................... 63
1. Actuarial Risk Assessment ....................... 63
* Assistant Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. C 2018, Erin Collins. Thanks to
Russell Gold, Jessica Eaglin, Jessica Erickson, Corinna Lain, Dawinder Sidhu, Jocelyn Simonson,
Allison Tait, and the participants of the 2017 American Association of Law Schools Midyear Meeting
Workshop, the 2017 Mid-Atlantic Junior Faculty Forum, the 2017 Southeastern Association of Law
Schools Meeting, and the University of Richmond School of Law faculty workshop for helpful
comments and conversations.
58 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 107:57
2. Sentencing Actuarially .......................... 66
a. Sentence Length Decisions ............... 67
b. Sentence Location Decisions ............. 69
B. THE PROMISES OF ACTUARIAL SENTENCING ........................ 72
1. Reducing Recidivism Through Rehabilitation ......... 72
2. Refining Risk Prediction ......................... 74
3. Increasing Efficiency ........................... 76
II. THE CORRECTIONAL ORIGINS OF ACTUARIAL SENTENCING .............. 77
A. CORRECTIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT: ASSESSING RISK TO ADMINISTER
PUNISHMENT ................................................. 78
1. Paroling Risk ................................. 78
2. Correcting Risk ............................... 79
3. Correctional Risk Assessment Principles: Use Only as
D irected ..................................... 83
B. ACTUARIAL SENTENCING: ASSESSING RISK TO DETERMINE
PUNISHMENT ................................................. 85
1. Going "Off-Label" in Practice: Sentencing Risk ....... 85
2. Going "Off-Label" in Theory: Incapacitating Risk ..... 87
III. THE PROBLEMS OF ACTUARIAL SENThNCING ............................ 91
A. QUESTIONING THE BENEFIT ...................................... 91
B. IDENTIFYING "OFF-LABEL" COSTS ................................ 98
C. REASSESSING ACTUARIAL SENTENCING ........................... 106
C ONCLUSION ...................................................... 108
INTRODUCTION
Predictive data about future criminal activity increasingly determine an indi-
vidual' s fate within the criminal justice system. Data may determine if a person is
arrested and charged. If he is, that data will influence whether he is released on
bail. And if he is then convicted and incarcerated, data may determine where he
is housed, what programs he must complete, and whether he is eventually
released on parole. And now, as a result of a practice that is gaining popularity,
predictive data may even determine the length of his sentence and whether he
serves that sentence in his own home or in prison.
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Actuarial sentencing, also called "evidence-based sentencing,"' is the practice
of using actuarial risk assessment tools to guide sentencing decisions. Actuarial
risk assessment tools seek to predict the likelihood an individual will commit
crimes in the future based on the presence or absence of factors that statistically
correlate with recidivism.2 Proponents claim that judges are already making these
predictions, and actuarial tools simply help them do it better.3 In other words,
they imply that this use of risk assessment information refines and enhances an
established, normatively sound practice but does not fundamentally change the
role of risk prediction at sentencing.
Actuarial sentencing is part of a larger movement that aims to be smart, rather
than tough, on crime.4 This movement embraces data-driven practices to ensure
that prison is reserved for those who represent a true danger to the public.5
Proponents promise that actuarial sentencing and other evidence-based practices
will help us reorient the criminal justice system away from backward-looking,
retributivist considerations and toward the future, with greater emphasis on
increasing public safety through rehabilitation.6 In theory, at least, this new
"brand" of criminal justice uses data to help identify who can serve their sentence
1. See Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59, 61-62 (2017); Sonja B.
Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV.
803, 809 (2014) (describing "evidence-based sentencing"); see also NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
NCSC FACT SHEET: EVIDENCE-BASED SENTENCING 1 (Aug. 2014), http://www.ncsc.org/-/media/
Microsites/Files/CSI/EBS%20Fact%20Sheet%208-27-14.ashx [https://perma.cc/3L6N-DQX6] (same).
Other scholars have called this practice "risk-based sentencing."
2. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 rptrs. note a (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft
2017).
3. See, e.g., Jordan M. Hyatt et al., Follow the Evidence: Integrate Risk Assessment into Sentencing,
23 FED. SENT'G REP. 266, 266 (2011) (arguing that introducing risk assessment information into
sentencing "would hardly represent a sea change" because "[w]ith varying degrees of formality, judges
already consider risk at sentencing"); Richard P. Kern & Mark H. Bergstrom, A View from the Field:
Practitioners' Response to Actuarial Sentencing: An "Unsettled" Proposition, 25 FED. SENT'G REP.
185, 185 (2013) ("[R]isk has and will continue to be used by courts at sentencing, whether formally or
informally.").
4. See generally J.C. Oleson, Risk in Sentencing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables and Evidence-
Based Sentencing, 64 SMU L. REV. 1329, 1336-37 (2011) (identifying the interest in actuarial sentencing
as part of the call to "sentence 'smarter ); TRACY W. PETERS & ROGER K. WARREN, NAT'L CTR. FOR
STATE COURTS, GETTING SMARTER ABOUT SENTENCING: NCSC's SENTENCING REFORM SURVEY (2006),
http://www.ncsc.org/-/media/ Microsites/Files/CSI/GettingSmarter SentencingReformSurveyFinalPub.
ashx [https://perma.cc/4XDW-AWCV] (identifying evidence-based practices as a "smart" sentencing
reform).
5. See, e.g., Hon. Michael Marcus, Smarter Sentencing: On the Need to Consider Crime Reduction as
a Goal, 40 CT. REV. 16, 22 (2004).
6. See, e.g., Kern & Bergstrom, supra note 3, at 185 ("[T]he consideration of risk does represent a
shift in the purposes of sentencing, moving from backward-looking retributive approach with a focus on
uniformity, proportionality, and reduction of unwarranted disparity to a forward-looking utilitarian
approach with a focus on public safety and crime reduction."); see also Peggy McGarry, Introduction to
RAM SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE CTR. ON SENTENCING & CORR., RECALIBRATING
JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF 2013 STATE SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS TRENDS 2 (2014), https://www.vera.
org/publications/state- sentencing-and-corrections -trends -2013 [https://perma.cc/N2DC-DQ6L] ("From
appalling incarceration numbers, budgetary crises, and greater public knowledge, this momentum for
reform has redirected the discussion on crime away from the question of how best to punish to how best
to achieve long-term public safety.").
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in the community without threatening the public and, in so doing, conserves ex-
pensive incarceratory resources for those who cannot.7
In light of these promises, it is unsurprising that actuarial sentencing has been
met with great acclaim. It has been embraced by the National Center for State
Courts8 and the Conference of Chief Justices and the Conference of State Court
Administrators.9 Present and former state sentencing commissioners have
endorsed it,"0 and policymakers have called it the "most promising way forward"
and "the new frontier in sentencing policy and practice." 1 Actuarial sentencing is
currently practiced in more than twenty jurisdictions,12 and its popularity is likely
to grow in light of a recent notable development: the American Law Institute
adopted the practice in its 2017 revision of the Model Penal Code for
Sentencing.13
Recently, however, some scholars have begun to caution against this practice.
They have argued that the risk tools incorporate certain characteristics-such
as gender and socioeconomic status-that raise constitutional concerns.14 They
have questioned the tools' accuracy15 and their purported objectivity.16 And
they have highlighted that this practice, which involves making predictions
based on group data, undermines the principle that sentences should be
7. See WILLIAM R. KELLY WITH ROBERT PITMAN & WILLIAM STREUSAND, FROM RETRIBUTION TO
PUBLIC SAFETY: DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 177 (2017) (calling for a
new "brand" of the criminal justice system that "involves problem solving and recidivism reduction").
8. See PAMELA M. CASEY ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, USING OFFENDER RISK AND NEEDS
ASSESSMENT AT SENTENCING: GUIDANCE FOR COURTS FROM A NATIONAL WORKING GROUP 7 (2011),
http://www.ncsc.org/-/media/microsites/files/csi/rna%20guide%20final.ashx [https://perma.ccIW9QC-
LHCD].
9. See CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES & CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADM'RS, RESOLUTION 7: IN
SUPPORT OF THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON USING RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT INFORMATION IN THE
SENTENCING PROCESS (2011), http://www.ncsc.org/-/media/Microsites/Files/CSI/RNA%202015/Support%
20Guiding%20Principles%20Using%20RNAs.ashx [https://perma.cc/NC86-3YD7].
10. See Kern & Bergstrom, supra note 3, at 185. Richard Kern was the Director of the Virginia
Criminal Sentencing Commission and Mark Bergstrom is the Executive Director of the Pennsylvania
Commission on Sentencing.
11. See Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Sentencing: Are We Up to the Task?, 23 FED. SENT'G REP.
153, 153, 157 nn.1 & 3 (2010).
12. See Starr, supra note 1, at 809.
13. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft 2017) (the
section is entitled Evidence-Based Sentencing; Offender Treatment Needs and Risk of Reoffending).
The Model Penal Code is highly influential upon state practices and its "code and its commentaries have
been the intellectual focus of much American criminal law scholarship." Paul H. Robinson & Markus D.
Dubber, The American Model Penal Code: A Brief Overview, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 319, 320 (2007).
14. See Starr, supra 1, at 806.
15. For example, computer scientists recently examined the reliability of a popular risk assessment
tool and found that it "is no more accurate or fair than the predictions of people with little to no criminal
justice expertise." Julia Dressel & Hany Farid, The Accuracy, Fairness, and Limits of Predicting
Recidivism, 4 ScI. ADVANCES 1, 3 (2018); see also Brian Netter, Using Group Statistics to Sentence
Individual Criminals: An Ethical and Statistical Critique of the Virginia Risk Assessment Program, 97 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699,712 (2007).
16. See Eaglin, supra note 1, at 64 (arguing that "actuarial risk tools, while 'scientific' in the sense
that developers use technology to assess risk, reflect normative judgments familiar to sentencing law and
policy debates").
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individualized.17 However, even the scholars who have begun to critically
scrutinize actuarial sentencing have focused primarily on issues with the actua-
rial method of assessment. Existing scholarship has thus failed to ask a critical
question: is the risk inquiry these tools advance normatively sound?18
As a result, these conversations about the promises and perils of actuarial sen-
tencing have overlooked an important point: actuarial risk assessment tools
are not intended for use in sentencing.19 Rather, they were developed to guide
decisions of correctional authorities-such as how to efficiently and effectively
rehabilitate inmates during their incarceration-after a judge has announced a
sentence.20 In other words, such tools were created to guide decisions about how
to administer punishment, not about how much punishment is due. In fact, the
social scientists who developed the tools that are being incorporated into sentenc-
ing decisions expressly disavow their use to "assist in establishing the just pen-
alty," specifically in decisions about whether to incarcerate and the length of the
sentence. 21 And yet, that is precisely how they are being used. Actuarial sentenc-
ing is, in short, an "off label" application of these predictive tools.
22
17. See Dawinder S. Sidhu, Moneyball Sentencing, 56 B.C. L. REV. 671,702-04 (2015).
18. See, e.g., Starr, supra note 1, at 872 (concluding that "[r]isk prediction is here to stay as part of
sentencing, and perhaps actuarial instruments can play a legitimate role," but suggesting these
instruments "should not include demographic and socioeconomic variables"); see also Sidhu, supra note
17, at 687 (noting that "forecasting the risk of recidivism is an important function in the criminal justice
system").
19. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN
ACTUARIAL AGE 188 (2007) (noting that actuarial prediction instruments "were generated, created,
driven by sociology and criminology. . . .They had no root, nor any relation to the jurisprudential
theories of just punishment"). One exception to this general oversight is a recent white paper that notes
the possibility that judges may use a risk tool that was "designed for a correctional-not a sentencing-
population." Jordan M. Hyatt & Steven L. Chanenson, The Use of Risk Assessment at Sentencing:
Implications for Research and Policy 8 (Villanova Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 2017-1040, 2016), https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?referer-https://www.google.com/&httpsredir- 1 &article= 1201 &context=wps [https://perma.cc/SXW5-
QZQ5].
20. HARCOURT, supra note 19, at 187-88.
21. See Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 567, 572 (Ind. 2010) (quoting D.A. ANDREWS & JAMES
L. BONTA, THE LEVEL OF SERVICE INVENTORY-REVISED USER'S MANUAL 1 (2001)).
22. I have adopted the term "off label" from the medical context, in which it is used to describe the
practice of prescribing a medication to treat a condition other than the condition for which it has gained
FDA approval. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Understanding Unapproved Use of Approved Drugs
"Off Label," https://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Other/ OffLabel/ucm20041767.htm [https://perma.cc/
5EDC-HN5T] (defining "off-label"). See generally Christopher M. Wittich et al., Ten Common
Questions (and Their Answers) About Off-Label Drug Use, 87 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 982 (2012)
(describing the practice of prescribing medicine in "off-label" ways); see also Sandra Mayson, Off-
Label Law Enforcement 1 (2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (work-in-progress
using the term 'off label' to describe the use of coercive force for a purpose "other than [the one] it was
ostensibly designed to serve"). In their recent white paper, Hyatt and Chanenson offer a typology of
ways jurisdictions use risk assessment tools at sentencing and characterize certain uses as "off label."
See Hyatt & Chanenson, supra note 19, at 7-8 (distinguishing between jurisdictions that systemically
integrate risk assessment information from those that use the information in "off label" ways). In
contrast to Hyatt and Chanenson, however, this Article contends that all uses of actuarial risk
assessment methods at sentencing are "off label" uses.
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This Article reexamines the practice and promises of actuarial sentencing in
light of this observation. It scrutinizes the meaning of "risk" in the correctional
and sentencing contexts, the different mechanisms available for responding to
risk in these distinct contexts, and the consequences of those decisions. This anal-
ysis reveals that integrating actuarial risk assessment tools into sentencing deci-
sions departs from their original design and purpose. It identifies three points of
departure: the decisions actuarial risk assessment tools are used to support, the
punishment theories that support those decisions, and the consequences of those
decisions.
Ultimately, the Article contends that the application of actuarial risk assessment
information to sentencing decisions is neither a simple matter of "follow[ing] the
evidence"2 3 to smarter sentencing decisions, nor is it inconsequential. Rather, this
"off label" use can lead to negative, unintended consequences: it can justify an
increase-rather than a decrease-in our use of incarceration, and in a way that
undermines the fairness and integrity of our criminal justice system.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the practice and promises of
actuarial sentencing. It identifies the recent emergence of two sentencing-specific
applications of actuarial risk information and explores why this practice has
gained such enthusiastic support. Part II identifies an as-yet unexamined reason
to question the laudatory claims of actuarial sentencing proponents: these tools
are not designed for use in the sentencing context. To bring this critique into
focus, Part II offers a historical account of the origins of actuarial risk prediction
that explores the differences between how and why these tools emerged, and how
and why they are integrated into sentencing. Finally, Part II reveals that this
repurposing of actuarial information leads to an unintended-or at least unac-
knowledged-punishment consequence, which is antithetical to the tools' reha-
bilitative origins.
Part III identifies the "off label," unintended consequences of incorporating
actuarial information into sentencing decisions. Specifically, Part III contends
that actuarial sentencing can lead to more-not less-reliance on incarceration.
This counterintuitive possibility results from the way actuarial tools define and
measure risk. They define risk broadly, as the likelihood that an individual will
commit, or be arrested for, an offense of unspecified severity, and measure it
based on a range of characteristics-such as gender and educational history-
that are anathema to a just sentencing inquiry. Perhaps this prediction mechanism
is acceptable, or at least understandable, when the tools are used for their intended
Recently-in another arguably "off-label" application-actuarial risk information has been used to
guide bail decisions. That use has been the subject of increasing scholarly scrutiny. See, e.g., Lauryn P.
Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk, 85 U. CHI. L. REv. 677 (2018); Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous
Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490 (2018). This paper focuses exclusively on the issues that arise when risk
assessment is used for punishment purposes. As the bail/pre-trial detention decision is not considered
punishment, see U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987), it involves a risk inquiry that is distinct from
sentencing. Therefore, it is beyond the scope of this paper.
23. See Hyatt et al., supra note 3, at 267 (urging the United States Sentencing Commission to "follow
the evidence" by integrating risk assessment into sentencing).
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purpose-to administer punishment in a way that reduces an individual's risk of
recidivism. But when this mechanism is applied at sentencing, it imposes an
underappreciated systemic risk that cannot be countenanced: that we will incar-
cerate someone who poses no risk to public safety because of non-culpable, per-
sonal characteristics.
I. THE RISE OF ACTUARIAL SENTENCING
Around 2000, a handful of jurisdictions began providing risk assessment infor-
mation to judges in advance of sentencing. 24 Over the last decade, and particu-
larly over the last few years, actuarial sentencing has gained the support of a
number of influential organizations and policymakers, including the American
Law Institute,25 the National Center for State Courts (NCSC),26 the Conference of
Chief Justices and the Conference of State Court Administrators,27 and current
and former state sentencing commissioners. 2 This Part seeks to explain this en-
thusiastic embrace of actuarial sentencing before turning, in Parts II and III, to an
analysis of why this enthusiasm is unwarranted.
This Part begins by providing an overview of the practice of actuarial sentenc-
ing. This overview first explains what actuarial tools are and how they are used,
and then describes how these tools are used in the sentencing context. It identifies
two sentencing-specific applications of actuarial risk information: decisions about
sentence length and determinations of sentence location. The Part then surveys
the literature supporting this new practice to identify the purported promises of
actuarial sentencing.
A. THE PRACTICE OF ACTUARIAL SENTENCING
Actuarial sentencing is the practice of using actuarial risk assessment tools to
guide sentencing decisions. It consists of two components: the actuarial assess-
ment of risk and the integration of that assessment into sentencing decisions. This
section describes each of these components in turn.
1. Actuarial Risk Assessment
Actuarial risk assessment tools are surveys that guide the inquirer through a se-
ries of questions about the presence or absence of recidivism risk factors in the
subject.29 The inquirer allocates the subject a certain number of points for each
factor, each of which is weighted according to the strength of its correlation with
24. See Warren, supra note 11, at 157 (noting Iowa has included risk assessment information in
presentence reports since 2000 and Missouri began sending such information to judges in 2005). As will
be discussed in further detail below, Virginia was an early adopter of actuarial risk assessment
sentencing, initiating a pilot program in 1994 to use risk information to change an offender's sentence.
See infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
25. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft 2017).
26. See CASEY ET AL., supra note 8, at 7.
27. See CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES & CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADM'RS, supra note 9.
28. See supranote 10.
29. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2154.7(e) (2010) (defining "risk assessment instrument" as "an
empirically based worksheet which uses factors that are relevant in predicting recidivism").
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recidivism.30 Based on the total score, the subject is identified as having a "low,"
"moderate," or "high" risk of recidivism.31 Thus, in the context of the criminal
justice system, actuarial risk assessment is the process of using characteristics
that statistically correlate with recidivism ("recidivism risk factors") to predict
"'who will or will not behave criminally' in the future. '"32
Actuarial risk assessment tools vary in the number and type of recidivism risk
factors they consider.33 Despite the existence of a variety of tools, however, each
tool considers criminal history34 and other factors. Their algorithm can thus be
distilled down to "criminal history plus" other characteristics, and the plus varies
from tool to tool. Some of these plus factors are "static," which means they are
statistically "related to recidivism but cannot be altered through the delivery of
services," such as age at first offense, gender, and family criminality.35 Others are
"dynamic," or can change through the passage of time or intervention, such as
current age, employment status, antisocial attitude, and substance addiction.36
Although all of the tools aim to measure the individual's risk of recidivism, there
is some variance in how they define recidivism. Some tools, for example, define
recidivism to include rearrest for an offense of any severity, regardless of whether
the arrest leads to filing of criminal charges or a conviction. Those tools, therefore,
predict the likelihood someone with the defendant's characteristics will be rearrested
30. See NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44087, RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 2 (2015) (describing an overview of the risk assessment process); Edward J.
Latessa & Brian Lovins, The Role of Offender Risk Assessment: A Policy Maker Guide, 5 VICTIMS &
OFFENDERS 203, 206, 210-12 (2010) (same). For some instruments, the weight of the particular factor is
apparent from the face of the tool or survey. See id. at 210-11. Some instruments, such as COMPAS, use
a proprietary algorithm, and the accounting mechanism is not publicly available. See State v. Loomis,
881 N.W.2d 749, 761 (Wis. 2016) (explaining that the company that developed the COMPAS
instrument "considers COMPAS a proprietary instrument and a trade secret" and therefore the company
"does not disclose how the risk scores are determined or how the factors are weighed").
31. JAMES, supra note 30, at 2.
32. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 rptrs. note a (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft
2017) (quoting Stephen D. Gottfredson & Laura J. Moriarty, Statistical Risk Assessment: Old Problems
and New Applications, 52 CRIME & DELINQ. 178, 192 (2006)).
33. See Eaglin, supra note 1, at 81 (describing different tools).
34. JULIAN V. ROBERTS, PUNISHING PERSISTENT OFFENDERS: EXPLORING COMMUNITY AND
OFFENDER PERSPECTIVES 22 (2008) (identifying criminal history as a "central component of the most
common" risk assessment tools, such as the LSI-R or the salient Factor Score); John Monahan &
Jennifer L. Skeem, Risk Assessment in Criminal Sentencing, 12 ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 489, 503
(2016) (noting that "[i]t has long been axiomatic in the field of risk assessment that past crime is the best
predictor of future crime" and therefore, "[a]ll actuarial risk assessment instruments reflect this
empirical truism. The empirically derived California Static Risk Assessment Instrument, for example,
contains 22 risk factors for criminal recidivism, fully 20 of which-all but gender and age-are indices
of past crime").
35. JENNIFER K. ELEK ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, USING RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT
INFORMATION AT SENTENCING: OBSERVATIONS FROM TEN JURISDICTIONS 1 (2015); see also Latessa &
Lovins, supra note 30, at 208-09.
36. See Latessa & Lovins, supra note 30, at 209; see also ELEK ET AL., supra note 35, at 46.
37. See Nancy J. King, Sentencing and Prior Convictions: The Past, the Future, and the End of the
Prior-Conviction Exception to Apprendi, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 523, 544 (2014) (noting that recidivism
measures may "include any subsequent violent crime, felony arrest, felony conviction, conviction for
any crime including a misdemeanor, or violation of a condition of supervised release"). For a critique of
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within the specified time frame, without reference to actual culpability. Others
define recidivism as reconviction for a new offense, but there is variation even
among this subset of tools. Some define recidivism as reconviction for any offense,
including a violation of probation; others define recidivism more narrowly as only
reconviction for a felony.38
Regardless of how any particular tool defines recidivism, a few common prin-
ciples unite all of them. First, the prediction remains actuarial.39 The risk assess-
ment process is "about predicting group behavior (identifying groups of higher
risk offenders). It is not about prediction at the individual level."4 That is, risk
assessment tools identify groups of high-risk offenders, not a particular high-risk
individual.41 The risk score indicates the likelihood someone who shares an indi-
vidual's characteristics will recidivate, not the likelihood that particular a individ-
ual will recidivate.
Second, the risk score indicates the likelihood of whether someone with the
offender's characteristics will recidivate, not how they are likely to recidivate.
Indeed, most tools do not distinguish between the likelihood the offender will
recidivate by committing a serious offense or a low-level drug or property crime,
but rather provide only a general prediction of the likelihood of recidivism.4 2 One
exception is the Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative
Sanctions (COMPAS) tool, which distinguishes between "General Recidivism
Risk" and "Violent Recidivism Risk. 43
Finally, the risk score indicates only the likelihood of future behavior; it does
not indicate the relative severity of the crime the subject has most recently
defining recidivism to include arrest, see Anna Roberts, Arrests as Guilt (May 17, 2018) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
38. See Kelly Hannah-Moffat, Actuarial Sentencing: An "Unsettled" Proposition, 30 JUST. Q. 270,
278-79 (2013) ("Among the available risk tools, recidivism is variably defined as re-arrest,
reconviction, or re-incarceration .... Many actuarial risk instruments do not differentiate between types
of recidivism."); see also King, supra note 37, at 544 n.109 (citing additional sources).
The definition of recidivism may even vary within a particular jurisdiction. Virginia, for example,
uses actuarial risk assessment information to guide decisions about whether to divert low-level offenders
from prison and increase the sentencing guidelines recommendation for certain sex offenders. The
diversionary risk assessment tool defines recidivism as a subsequent conviction for a felony offense
within three years. See VA. CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMM'N, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 94 (2014). The sex
offender risk assessment tool, by contrast, defines recidivism as rearrest "for a new sex offense or other
crime against a person." See id. at 39.
39. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PROVING THE UNPROVABLE: THE ROLE OF LAW, SCIENCE, AND
SPECULATION IN ADJUDICATING CULPABILITY AND DANGEROUSNESS 101 (2007) ("An actuarial
approach relies, as insurance actuaries do, on a finite number of preidentified variables that statistically
correlate to risk and that produce a definitive probability or probability range of risk.").
40. Wis. DEP'T OF CORR., ELECTRONIC CASE REFERENCE MANUAL: COMPAS ASSESSMENT
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, https://doc.helpdocsonline.com/dcc-business-process [https://perma.
cc/NYA3-2ZZ8].
41. Id.
42. See Hannah-Moffat, supra note 38, at 278-79 (noting that "[m]any actuarial risk instruments do
not differentiate between types of recidivism").
43. See NORTHPOINTE, PRACTITIONERS GUIDE TO COMPAS 1 (2012), http://www.northpointeinc.
com/files/technical documents/FieldGuide2_081412.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9H6-N29S] (describing the
COMPAS risk assessment tool).
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committed. As Latessa and Lovins explain, "though a felon has been con-
victed of a more serious offense than a misdemeanant, their relative risk of
reoffending may have nothing to do with the seriousness of the crime."44 In
fact, most risk assessment instruments do not incorporate the crime of con-
viction into the prediction inquiry,45 as that factor has not been found to be
predictive of recidivism.46
2. Sentencing Actuarially
Surprisingly, most jurisdictions that encourage or require actuarial sentencing
do not restrict how judges may use this information at sentencing. Instead, they
simply direct the department responsible for preparing the presentence report to
conduct a risk assessment and provide it to the judge, without guidance as to the
purposes for which it may be used.4 7 It appears that, until recently, judges who
were authorized to consider risk information were doing so to identify and impose
conditions of probation.4 8
An analysis of the Model Penal Code's new section on evidence-based sen-
tencing,4 9 along with state case law and sentencing guidelines, reveals that two
sentencing-specific actuarial practices have emerged: determinations about sen-
tence length and determinations about sentence location. Each will be explored
below.
These applications are sentencing-specific because only a sentencing judge is
empowered to make these decisions. The power to determine the severity of a
sentence-to determine how much punishment is due a particular offender for a
particular offense-is a core judicial function. 0 After the judge imposes a sen-
tence, the responsibility to execute that sentence then shifts to the executive
branch, specifically correctional authorities and parole boards (if the jurisdiction
allows for parole).5 1 Neither of these institutional actors, however, can reverse or
44. Latessa & Lovins, supra note 30, at 205-06.
45. See Starr, supra note 1, at 811 (noting that "almost none" of the actuarial risk instruments she
studied "include the crime for which the defendant was convicted in the case at hand").
46. See JAMES, supra note 30, at 7 ("The seriousness of the current offense is not a risk factor.").
47. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.500(1) (2014); see also Starr, supra note 1, at 839-40
(noting that "[g]enerally ...risk predictions are simply provided to sentencing judges and parole
boards").
48. See Warren, supra note 11, at 157 (finding that the ten jurisdictions that had incorporated risk
assessment into sentencing by 2010 used it "primarily for the purpose of determining the conditions of
probation supervision").
49. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft 2017).
50. Commonwealth v. Cole, 10 N.E.3d 1081, 1089 (Mass. 2014) ("At the core of the judicial
function is the power to impose a sentence."); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 962 N.E.2d 711, 718
(Mass. 2012) (describing the power to sentence as "a quintessential judicial power").
51. Cole, 10 N.E.3d at 1089 ("Once a sentence is imposed, the executive branch holds the power and
responsibility of executing it."). Jurisdictions differ as to whether probation authorities are judicial or
executive branch actors. See NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CCJ AND COSCA SURVEY OF EVIDENCE-
BASED PRACTICES IN SENTENCING AND PROBATION: BRANCH RESPONSIBLE FOR PROBATION 1 (2012), http://
www.ncsc.org/-/media/microsites/files/csi/branch-responsible-for-probation.ashx [https://perma.cc/8UB S-
NE8V] (finding that in some jurisdictions probation is a function of the executive branch, in some it is a
judicial branch function, and in others it is a mixed function).
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modify the judge's sentencing decision. Even when a parole board decides to
release a defendant from incarceration before the expiration of his sentence, for
example, that decision does not and cannot change the sentencing judge's deci-
sion about the length of his sentence. The defendant must complete her sentence,
albeit under community rather than institutional supervision. 2
a. Sentence Length Decisions
The length of a defendant's sentence-how long he or she will be under the
supervision and control of state correctional authorities-is a paradigmatic sen-
tencing decision. This decision is entrusted solely to the sentencing judge, subject
to the parameters set by the state or federal legislature and recommendations of
any relevant sentencing commission. 3
The recently approved Model Penal Code endorses the use of risk assessment
information to inform this key sentencing decision. Model Penal Code § 6B.09(2)
orders a sentencing commission to develop actuarial instruments that "estimate
the relative risks that individual offenders pose to public safety through their future
criminal conduct" and "incorporate [this information] into the sentencing guide-
lines."54 The commentary clarifies that this provision "would permit the use of
actuarial offender risk assessments as a basis for punishments more severe than
offenders would otherwise have received."5 5 Meanwhile, § 6B.09(3) directs that
"unusually low-risk" offenders should be sentenced to community sanction or a
"shorter prison term" than otherwise required by the statute or guidelines.5 6
Virginia, an early adopter of actuarial sentencing practices, was the first to
employ actuarial risk assessment to sentence length decisions.5 7 Since 2001, it
has authorized the use of actuarial information to increase sentencing exposure
for adults who are convicted of certain sex offenses and predicted to pose a high
risk of recidivism. 8 Recently, other jurisdictions have begun to follow suit. In
July 2017, for example, Kansas began using risk assessment results to set the sen-
tencing parameters for juvenile offenders. Juveniles convicted of a felony who
score as a low or moderate risk may be sentenced to up to fifteen months, whereas
52. As the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recently explained, the parole board's authority
is "limited to the release from custody of a defendant within the maximum term of imprisonment
imposed by the sentencing judge." Cole, 10 N.E.3d at 1087. It "has the power only to permit a defendant
to serve the balance of his term of imprisonment outside the prison walls,... and the power to revoke
the parole permit and return the defendant to prison or jail for the balance of his term of imprisonment."
Id.
53. See supra note 50.
54. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09(2) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft 2017).
55. Id. § 6B.09 cmt. e.
56. Id. § 6B.09(3).
57. See Jonathan Simon, Reversal of Fortune: The Resurgence of Individual Risk Assessment in
Criminal Justice, 1 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. Sci. 397, 407 (2005) (noting in 2005 that Virginia was the only
state to use actuarial risk assessment to identify "high rate" offenders).
58. VA. CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 38, at 39. Virginia began using risk prediction to
authorize an increase in sentencing exposure for sex offenders deemed to be a high risk of recidivism in
2001. Id.
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those who score as a high risk may be sentenced up to eighteen months.5 9
As mentioned above, however, most jurisdictions that authorize actuarial sen-
tencing simply direct that the risk information be provided to a judge in advance
of sentencing without any guidance on how it should-or should not-be used.60
Washington State, for example, simply advises that a sentencing court "may
order the department [of probation] to compete a risk assessment report," and that
if that report is "available before sentencing, the report shall be provided to the
court."61 Apparently, then, judges in these jurisdictions may use the results for
any purpose they deem appropriate, including to inform their decision about the
appropriate length of a sentence (subject to any applicable statutory and constitu-
tional constraints). Cognitive behavioral research into the anchoring effect62 sug-
gests judges who receive predictive risk information may modify their sentence
in the direction of the risk prediction.63 A few empirical studies support this
inference.64
This common-sense inference about the influential power of risk assessment
information has been demonstrated in at least one actual case. In Wisconsin, risk
assessment predictions are provided to the judge along with the presentence
investigation report.65 In 2013, Paul Zilly pled guilty to stealing a lawnmower in
Wisconsin, and the prosecutor recommended one year in jail followed by supervi-
sion. 66 At sentencing, however, after noting Mr. Zilly scored as high-risk for vio-
lent recidivism and medium-risk for general recidivism, which the judge
59. See KAN. SENTENCING COMM'N, KANSAS SENTENCING GUIDELINES DESK REFERENCE MANUAL 7
(2016) (describing changes to the law regarding case length limits, effective July 1, 2017). The court
may also use the risk information to set the juvenile's term of probation, and may extend the term of a
high-risk juvenile's term of probation by up to six months "if a juvenile needs time to complete an
evidence-based program determined to be necessary based on the results of a validated risk and needs
assessment." Id. at 9-10.
60. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
61. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.500(1) (2014).
62. See Fritz Strack & Thomas Mussweiler, Explaining the Enigmatic Anchoring Effect:
Mechanisms of Selective Accessibility, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 437, 437 (1997) (defining
the "anchoring effect" as "a biased estimate toward an arbitrary value considered by judges before
making a numerical estimate").
63. See Starr, supra note 1, at 867 ("Even if a particular judge does not really trust the instrument, its
prediction might influence her thinking through anchoring.").
64. For example, Professor Sonja Starr conducted an informal study with eighty-three criminal law
students and found, similarly, that prediction information influenced participants' decisions about an
appropriate sentence for a hypothetical case. See id. at 867-69 (describing the study). A study conducted
by the Pennsylvania Sentencing Commission also suggests that judges, probation officers, and criminal
law practitioners are influenced by exposure to risk assessment information. See PA. COMM'N ON
SENTENCING, RISK/NEEDS ASSESSMENT PROJECT, INTERIM REPORT 8: COMMUNICATING RISK AT
SENTENCING 1, 6-11 (2014), http://www.hominid.psu.edu/specialty-programs/pacs/publications-and-
research/risk-assessment/phase-i-reports/interim-report- 8-communicating-risk-at-sentencing/view [https://
perma.cc/NY63-TK3Q] (describing the study and its findings).
65. See State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 754 (Wis. 2016).
66. See Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias: There's Software Used Across the Country to Predict Future
Criminals. And It's Biased Against Blacks., PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/
article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/RA73-X8SW] (discussing
the Zilly case).
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characterized as "about as bad as it could be," the judge rejected the plea deal and
instead imposed a sentence of two years in prison followed by three years of
supervision.67 After Mr. Zilly appealed, the court reduced his sentence to eighteen
months, admitting, "Had I not had the [risk assessment information], I believe it
would likely be that I would have given one year, six months."68
b. Sentence Location Decisions
A second paradigmatic sentencing decision is the determination of where the
defendant will serve his sentence: in institutional confinement (prison or jail),
under community supervision (probation), or a combination of the two. This is a
sentencing-specific decision because only the sentencing judge is empowered to
determine the initial, default location of a defendant's sentence. 69 Certainly, cor-
rections officials can alter this location, based on developments that occur after
the sentence is determined. A defendant sentenced to community supervision
who does not comply with the terms of probation may be incarcerated, in some
instances without judicial intervention,70 and a defendant sentenced to incarcera-
tion may be released into the community to serve the remainder of her sentence
on parole, again without the approval of a judge.71 Significantly, however, all of
these decisions are made after sentence has been announced, and, absent subse-
quent intervening developments, the defendant will serve her sentence in the
location set by the judge.
In contrast to the sentence-length use discussed above, which remains some-
what uncommon, the use of actuarial risk information to inform sentencing-loca-
tion decisions is fairly prevalent. Jurisdictions have integrated risk predictions
into at least three different sentence-location decisions: (1) whether to sentence a
defendant to probation or incarceration, (2) whether to divert otherwise prison-
bound offenders to jail or probation, and (3) whether to suspend part or all of a
prison sentence for one spent in the community.
First, some jurisdictions use actuarial information to determine whether a de-
fendant who is eligible to serve his sentence in the community or at an institution
should be sentenced to probation or incarceration.72 The 2016 Wisconsin case of
State v. Loomis illustrates this approach.73 Eric Loomis was arrested in Wisconsin
while driving a stolen car. The state alleged he was the driver in a drive-by shoot-
ing; however, Mr. Loomis denied involvement in the shooting and maintained he
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Again, as with the length of the defendant's sentence, this decision is restrained by any relevant
sentencing statutes or guidelines.
70. See Fiona Doherty, Obey All Laws and Be Good: Probation and the Meaning of Recidivism, 104
GEo. L.J. 291, 326 (2016) (noting that some states "have allowed probation officers to impose short jail
or prison sentences as administrative sanctions without specific court approval" and providing
examples).
71. See Commonwealth v. Cole, 10 N.E.3d 1081, 1089 (Mass. 2014) (noting that "the judiciary may
not interfere" with parole decisions).
72. See, e.g., State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016).
73. Id.
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drove the car only after the shooting occurred. He ultimately pleaded guilty to
operating a motor vehicle without consent and to eluding a police officer.74
The presentence investigation report submitted to the judge included a
Correctional Offender Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS) risk assess-
ment, which indicated Mr. Loomis presented a high risk of pretrial, general, and
violent recidivism. 7 In ruling out probation-that is, in deciding to incarcerate
Mr. Loomis instead of sentencing him to a community-based sentence-the cir-
cuit court noted that Mr. Loomis had been "identified, through the COMPAS
assessment, as an individual who is at high risk to the community," and that one
reason it was ruling out probation was that "the risk assessment tools that have
been utilized, suggest that you're extremely high risk to re-offend.
76
In jurisdictions that follow this first approach, actuarial information can weigh
in favor of either a community-based (probation) or institutional (prison or jail)
sentence-risk prediction may lead to either a better or worse outcome for the de-
fendant. Under a second approach, however, actuarial risk predictions can lead
only to a better location decision for the defendant. This diversionary approach
uses actuarial information to identify low-risk, prison-bound defendants and sen-
tence them to community supervision or jail (meaning a sentence less than
twelve months) in lieu of prison.77 Defendants in these jurisdictions would,
absent consideration of risk assessment information, be sentenced to prison.78
The Model Penal Code, for example, instructs the sentencing commission to
"develop actuarial instruments or processes to identify offenders who ... are
subject to a presumptive or mandatory sentence of imprisonment" but present
an "unusually low risk to public safety," and recommends that the sentencing
judge have discretion to sentence such offenders to a "community sanction
rather than a prison term. 
' 71
Virginia employs risk information in precisely this way.8 It uses a "nonviolent
offender risk assessment instrument" to actuarially predict the recidivism risk of
defendants who have been convicted of specified nonviolent felonies and who,
according to state sentencing guidelines, are recommended for a prison
74. Id. at 754.
75. Id. at 754-55.
76. Id. at 755 (quoting the circuit court at sentencing).
77. See, e.g., VA. CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 38, at 36 ("The goal of the nonviolent
risk assessment instrument is to divert low-risk offenders who are recommended for incarceration on the
guidelines to an alternative sanction other than prison or jail. Therefore, nonviolent offenders who are
recommended for probation/no incarceration on the guidelines are not eligible for the assessment.").
78. See id.
79. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09(3) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft 2017). And,
as discussed above, the Model Penal Code also authorizes imposing shorter sentences on these
"unusually low-risk" offenders. Id.; see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
80. Virginia was a very early adopter of actuarial sentencing practices. See MODEL PENAL CODE:
SENTENCING § 6B.09 rptrs. note d (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft 2017) (describing Virginia as
"the first state to develop an actuarial risk-assessment tool to be used at sentencing for purposes of
diverting low-risk offenders otherwise bound for prison into community sanctions"). Virginia has
incorporated risk assessment into incarceration decisions statewide since 2002. VA. CRIMINAL
SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 38, at 86.
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sentence.81 This tool differs from the sex offender risk assessment tool discussed
above.8 2 Virginia's current nonviolent drug offender risk assessment tool consid-
ers a handful of factors deemed statistically significant to recidivism prediction,
including: the defendant's gender and age at the time of the offense; prior juve-
nile adjudications or adult felony convictions; and whether the defendant was
arrested or confined within the twelve months leading up to the offense.83 And
until 2013, the tool also considered marital status and employment status.84
Offenders who score below a certain threshold are recommended for an alter-
native sentence. Under this regime, an alternative sentence includes "anything
short of an actual state prison sentence," such as probation supervision, commu-
nity service, day or evening reporting, drug treatment programs, and incarceration
at a local correctional facility.86 Notably, a defendant is considered "diverted" if
the guidelines recommended prison and she is sentenced instead to jail.8 Indeed,
in Virginia, 2011, one of the most common "alternative punishments" meted
under this program was a jail sentence instead of a prison sentence.88 Two im-
portant observations flow from this insight. First, the "alternative" sentence
was a diversion from prison, but not from incarceration. Those who were
diverted to a jail sentence were nevertheless incarcerated, albeit at a local facil-
ity instead of a state facility. Second, this practice demonstrates that there can
be overlap between sentence-location and sentence-length decisions. By decid-
ing to divert a defendant to jail instead of prison, Virginia judges routinely
decided to impose a shorter sentence than they would have without the risk
assessment information.
A third method of integrating actuarial information into sentence-location
decisions is to use it to decide whether to suspend part of a defendant's
81. VA. CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 38, at 86; see also Brian J. Ostrom & Neal B.
Kauder, The Evolution of Offender Risk Assessment in Virginia, 25 FED. SENT'G REP. 161, 166 (2013).
Certain individuals within these offense categories are categorically excluded from consideration for
risk-based diversion. For example, individuals with a prior felony conviction for a violent offense or
those convicted of selling one ounce or more of cocaine may not be considered for risk assessment
diversion. VA. CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 38, at 86.
82. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
83. See VA. CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMM'N, SENTENCING GUIDELINES COVERSHEET & WORKSHEET:
DRUG/OTHER, SECTION D (2017), http://www.vcsc.virginia.gov/worksheets 2017/DRG othws.pdf; see
also BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., OFFENDER RISK ASSESSMENT IN VIRGIIA: A THREE-STAGE EVALUATION
12 (2002), http://www.vcsc.virginia.gov/risk-off rpt.pdf. This tool was designed precisely for this
purpose and engages only in risk identification. In designing the tool, the Virginia Criminal Sentencing
Commission decided that "needs assessment"-or what I have above characterized as risk intervention-
was the work of probation officers and the Department of Corrections, not judges, and therefore was not
encompassed in the risk tool. Ostrom & Kauder, supra note 81, at 166.
84. See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 83, at 12, 27; see also Ostrom & Kauder, supra note 81, at 167
n.4.
85. VA. CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 38, at 87. In fiscal year 2014, 47.5% of those
assessed were recommended for an alternative sanction and almost 38% of those who were
recommended received an alternative sentence. Id.
86. Ostrom & Kauder, supra note 81, at 162-63.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 165.
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incarceratory sentence and replace that suspended portion with community super-
vision. California recently adopted this approach. Since 2015, California Rules of
Court have allowed courts to consider risk assessment information in determining
the length and conditions of an individual's period of mandatory supervision.89
Mandatory supervision, like probation, is a period of supervised release in the
community.9" However, "[m]andatory supervision . . . is not probation."91
Whereas probation is a period of community supervision that replaces a period of
incarceration, mandatory supervision is a period of community supervision that
follows incarceration. When sentencing individuals convicted of specified low-
level crimes, California courts "must suspend execution of a concluding portion"
of the sentence "as a period of mandatory supervision. "92 Notably, however,
California judges do not consider imposing a split sentence until they have al-
ready ruled out a sentence of probation.93
B. THE PROMISES OF ACTUARIAL SENTENCING
Proponents of actuarial sentencing make three primary claims about the bene-
fits of actuarial sentencing. First, they package actuarial sentencing as part of a
systemic reorientation of the criminal justice system that will increase public
safety by reducing recidivism.94 Second, they claim it simply increases the accu-
racy of decisions judges are already making. Finally, they emphasize the benefi-
ciaries of this innovation: the public, who save money while avoiding future
victimization and the defendants who avoid incarceration.96 This section identi-
fies and explores each of these promises.
1. Reducing Recidivism Through Rehabilitation
Many criminal justice reform advocates, including many actuarial sentencing
proponents, identify the systemic embrace of retributivism, and the concomitant
rise of a tough-on-crime ethos and harsh sentencing practices as the source of our
current systemic dysfunction.9 7 As a result, they claim, we have a criminal justice
89. CAL. R. CT. 4.415(c).
90. See Chief Prob. Officers of Cal., Mandatory Supervision: The Benefits of Evidence Based
Supervision Under Public Safety Realignmnet, 1 CPOC ISSUE BRiEF 1, 1 (2012) (defining mandatory
supervision as "a court ordered period of time in the community under the supervision of the county
probation department").
91. RICHARD CoUzENS ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE REALIGNMENT FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 5 (2014),
http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/cjr-faq.pdf ("Mandatory supervision [under California's
criminal justice realignment] is not probation. Mandatory supervision may not be used until the judge
denies probation and imposes a split sentence. The supervision is part of the sentence imposed by the
court.").
92. CAL. R. CT. 4.415(a).
93. See COUZENS ET AL., supra note 91.
94. See infra Section I.B.1.
95. See infra Section 1.B.2.
96. See infra Section 1.B.3.
97. See, e.g., Hon. William Ray Price Jr., Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Mo., State of the
Judiciary Address (Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=36875 [https://perma.cc/
GM5M-WG3G] (critiquing "tough on crime" policies and arguing in favor of actuarial sentencing). See
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system that resorts quickly to incarceration and, consequently, is struggling under
the weight of mass incarceration. As retributivism is understood to be a contribut-
ing cause of mass incarceration, reformers contend that we need a new "brand" of
criminal justice that focuses on public safety instead of punishing past behavior.98
Actuarial sentencing is marketed as an important component of this new brand
of public-safety focused criminal justice. For example, in 2011, Kentucky
enacted a Public Safety and Offender Accountability Act that declared that the
state's "primary objective of sentencing" is to "maintain public safety and hold
offenders accountable while reducing recidivism and criminal behavior and
improving outcomes for those offenders who are sentenced."99 In that same Act,
Kentucky legislators declared that sentencing judges "shall consider ...the
results of a defendant's risk and needs assessment included in the presentence
investigation." ' The Conference of Chief Justices and the Conference of State
Court Administrators similarly linked actuarial sentencing to a new era of public-
safety-focused sentencing law and policy. In their 2007 Resolution in support of
actuarial sentencing practices, they "elevated recidivism reduction as an impor-
tant consideration in the sentencing process" and stressed the importance of using
risk assessment tools to reduce recidivism.01 And the NCSC's National Working
Group on Using Risk and Needs Assessment Information at Sentencing identified
the first benefit of actuarial sentencing as "[c]ontributing to public safety/avoid-
ing further victimization by reducing recidivism. 1 2
Actuarial sentencing proponents specify that this practice will actualize its
recidivism reduction goal through rehabilitation. For example, the Indiana Court
Times, a publication of the Indiana State Court system, claims that the use of risk
assessment tools at sentencing will "enhance efforts to rehabilitate offenders,
reduce recidivism, and increase public safety."1 3 And in his 2010 State of the
Judiciary Address, Missouri Chief Justice William Ray Price Jr. called for a
movement away from "anger-based sentencing that ignores cost and effective-
ness" toward actuarial sentencing, which "assesses each offender's risk and then
fits that offender with the cheapest and most effective rehabilitation that he or she
needs."1 4 The NCSC's model curriculum for teaching judges about actuarial
generally Erin R. Collins, Status Courts, 105 GEO. L.J. 1481, 1513-17 (2017) (discussing the connection
between retributivist policies and mass incarceration).
98. See KELLY ET AL., supra note 7, at 177.
99. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.007(1) (West 2011).
100. Id. § 532.007(3)(a); see also COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS, LESSONS FROM THE STATES: REDUCING
RECIDIVISM AND CURBING CORRECTIONS COSTS THROUGH JUSTICE REINVESTMENT 4 (2013), https://
csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/FINAL State Lessons mbedit.pdf (noting that "many
states fail to focus their incarceration ...on the people most likely to commit future crimes" and
advocating for the use of risk assessment instruments).
101. CASEY ET AL., supra note 8, at 3.
102. Id. at 7.
103. Indiana's New Risk Assessment Tools: What You Should Know, IND. CT. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2011),
http://indianacourts.us/times/2011/04/risk-assessment/ [https://perma.cc/U375-W8ZW].
104. Price, supra note 97. Chief Judge Price also emphasized that actuarial sentencing would lead to
diversion of some offenders from prison, and "remov[al of] others from prison more quickly-after they
have learned their lesson, but before they are mined by worse offenders." Id.
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sentencing defines the practice as one that is "based on 'corrections' principles...
used to reduce recidivism." ' The NCSC's National Working Group similarly
links actuarial sentencing to rehabilitation. The Group dedicates five pages of its
guide to why and how jurisdictions should implement actuarial sentencing to
explicating the Risk-Needs-Responsivity (RNR) principle.10 6 As will be discussed
in greater detail in Part II, a core tenet of the RNR principle is that recidivism risk
should be identified so that it can be reduced through appropriate and effective re-
habilitative programming.
Thus, one marketing promise of actuarial sentencing is that it is one of many
reforms that will help increase public safety by reducing recidivism. Its propo-
nents contend that actuarial tools improve sentencing by shifting the emphasis
from retribution to rehabilitation-from extracting punishment for past bad
behavior to increasing public safety by reforming offenders.
2. Refining Risk Prediction
A related, but somewhat conflicting, claim offered in favor of actuarial sen-
tencing is that it simply enhances, but does not fundamentally change, the risk in-
quiry judges are and should be making at sentencing. From this perspective,
actuarial sentencing appears to be a simple matter of "follow[ing] the evidence"
to a better sentencing decision. 1 7 Its defense generally consists of three cumula-
tive assertions: (1) that risk prediction is a normatively sound sentencing func-
tion; (2) that these tools enhance the accuracy of this established prediction; and
(3) that its use therefore enhances sentencing decisions.
First, and often with a reference to Jurek v. Texas,1"8 actuarial sentencing propo-
nents emphasize that prediction of future behavior is an established component of
sentencing decisions.10 9 As the Supreme Court noted in Jurek, "any sentencing
authority must predict a convicted person's probable future conduct when it engages
in the process of determining what punishment to impose." ' 0 Accordingly, the
Model Penal Code reporters comment that adopting actuarial sentencing practices
"recognizes that American sentencing systems will and should take account of an
offender's future behavior, including the offender's amenability to rehabilitation
and propensity to recidivate, when assigning penalties." ' 1 Richard Kern, former
105. See NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EVIDENCE-BASED SENTENCING TO IMPROVE PUBLIC
SAFETY & REDUCE RECIDIVISM: A MODEL CURRICULUM FOR JUDGES 10 (2009), http://www.ncsc.org/
-/media/Microsites/Files/CSI/Education/FacultyHandbook.ashx [https://perma.cc/GPA7 -3GZ6].
106. See CASEY ET AL., supra note 8, at 4-8.
107. Hyatt et al., supra note 3, at 267.
108. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
109. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Risk Assessment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING
AND CORRECTIONS 196, 203-05 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz eds., 2012) ("The Supreme Court,
however, does not believe that risk assessment is antithetical to criminal justice. It has even approved
death sentences based on dangerousness determinations (Jurek v. Texas 1976, 275-276).").
110. 428 U.S. at 274-76.
111. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft 2017);
see also id. § 6B.09 cmt. e ("Judgments-or guesses-about offenders' future criminality have long
been integral to American criminal-justice systems at the judicial sentencing stage.").
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Director of the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission, and Mark Bergstrom,
Executive Director of the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing, similarly argue
in their defense of actuarial sentencing that risk prediction is inherent to sentencing
and "has and will continue to be used by courts at sentencing, whether formally or
informally."'1 12 Thus, a starting premise in the defense of actuarial sentencing is that
there is simply nothing new about predicting risk at sentencing.
Second, proponents claim that actuarial risk assessment tools simply help
judges make these normatively sound predictions more accurately. In support of
such arguments, proponents emphasize research demonstrating that actuarial
tools help judges predict recidivism more accurately than they could "clinically,"
without the assistance of actuarial predictions. 3 A "clinical" prediction is one
made based on "experience, skills, and judgment" 1 4 or simply "gut-level feel-
ings." ' Again, the Model Penal Code commentary is illustrative. The reporters
note that actuarial risk predictions "have been found superior to clinical predic-
tions built on the professional training, experience, and judgment of the persons
making predictions."16
Finally, proponents conclude that, because actuarial tools increase the accuracy
of clinical recidivism predictions, actuarial sentencing simply brings "the best
available information" to the task of predicting future behavior.117 Actuarial sen-
tencing is thus portrayed as a practice that applies data gleaned in one area of the
criminal justice system to another, a simple matter of "follow[ing] the evidence"
to enhance the accuracy of decisions judges would-and should-be making
anyway."' In other words, actuarial sentencing does not change what judges are
doing at sentencing; it simply enhances it. From this perspective, as the prediction
of future behavior is a normatively sound sentencing consideration, and because
112. Kern & Bergstrom, supra note 3, at 185; see also Richard Berk & Jordan Hyatt, Machine
Learning Forecasts of Risk to Inform Sentencing Decisions, 27 FED. SENT'G REP. 222, 222 (2015)
("Forecasting has been an integral part of the criminal justice system in the United States since its
inception. Judges, as well as law enforcement and correctional personnel, have long used projections of
relative and absolute risk to help inform their decisions." (footnotes omitted)); Hyatt et al., supra note 3,
at 266 ("With varying degrees of formality, judges already consider risk at sentencing. The judiciary
thinks about, and is concerned with, the relative danger of recidivism for each offender sentenced.").
113. See, e.g., Stephen D. Gottfredson & Laura J. Moriarty, Statistical Risk Assessment: Old
Problems and New Applications, 52 CRIME & DELINQ. 178, 180 (2006) ("There are generally two types
of risk and/or needs assessment instruments: those based on clinical judgment and those based on
actuarial practice. Clinical methods, also referred to as ... subjective assessments ... [or] intuition...
rely on professionals asking offenders a series of questions that most typically are not standardized ....
In virtually all decision-making situations, it has been found that actuarially developed predictions
outperform human judgments." (citations omitted)); Starr, supra note 1, at 851-52 (describing the
assumption that actuarial predictions outperform clinical predictions as "virtually gospel" in actuarial
sentencing literature).
114. Latessa & Lovins, supra note 30, at 210.
115. Gottfredson & Moriarty, supra note 113, at 180.
116. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft 2017).
117. Id.
118. Hyatt et al., supra note 3, at 267; see also Hyatt & Chanenson, supra note 19, at 10 (describing
responses to a judicial attitudes survey, which revealed that "[a]t-sentencing risk assessment is
perceived to be relatively commonplace by [the] group of judges" surveyed).
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these tools purport to predict future behavior more accurately, "judges who
eschew risk assessment instruments do so to their detriment."11 9
Together, the complimentary but somewhat contradictory claims outlined
above-that actuarial sentencing is part of a new era of criminal justice but, at the
same time, is simply an enhanced version of "business-as-usual"-allay concerns
that might otherwise arise from the application of actuarial risk information to
sentencing decisions. It therefore appears that actuarial sentencing helps judges
make accurate predictions about future behavior so that they can sentence a de-
fendant in a way that advances rehabilitative goals.
3. Increasing Efficiency
Additionally, proponents promise that actuarial sentencing will deliver
much-needed cost savings. They claim actuarial sentencing saves money that
would otherwise be expended on incarceratory resources for those who
would, without actuarial sentencing, be sent to prison but who would not
reoffend.120 Moreover, proponents contend, public safety increases in the
long run because people are rehabilitated, so they do not recidivate and return
to the criminal justice system.2 1 Of course, there are "human costs" that are
avoided through this practice-families are not torn apart, people are not
unnecessarily confined-but proponents tend to acknowledge those benefits
are secondary to the monetary savings.122
From this laudatory perspective, actuarial sentencing seems to be a benevolent
reform that carries no downsides. Its proponents promote it as a reform measure
that benefits both society, which saves money and is protected from future crime,
and defendants, who are rehabilitated and avoid incarceration.123 Through risk
assessment, as the American Law Institute promises, we can distinguish the
"most dangerous" from the "low-risk" offenders; we will reserve "scarce prison
resources" for the former and divert and rehabilitate the rest. 
124
119. Oleson, supra note 4, at 1340.
120. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final
Draft 2017) ("Particularly with respect to the identification of low-risk offenders, substantial monetary
savings may result from the diversion of offenders who otherwise would have been incarcerated. With
respect to the extended confinement of high-risk offenders, the avoidance of future serious
victimizations ... carries significant economic and intangible benefits."); Nicholas Scurich & John
Monahan, Evidence-Based Sentencing: Public Openness and Opposition to Using Gender, Age, and
Race as Risk Factors for Recidivism, 40 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 36, 36 (2016) ("Within ranges set by statute,
[evidence-based sentencing] would reduce the prison population by sentencing offenders assessed as at
lower risk of recidivism to shorter prison terms than offenders assessed as at higher risk of recidivism.").
121. See supra Section I.B.1.
122. The Model Penal Code reporters note, for example, that when actuarial tools are used to
"encourage sentencing judges to divert low-risk offenders from prisons to community sanctions, risk
assessments conserve scarce prison resources for the most dangerous offenders, reduce the overall costs
of the corrections system, and avoid the human costs of unneeded confinement to offenders, offenders'
families, and communities." MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST.,
Proposed Final Draft 2017).
123. See Starr, supra note 1, at 816 (noting that "[m]ost advocates of [actuarial sentencing] frame it
as a strategy for reducing incarceration and the resulting budgetary costs and social harms").
124. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft 2017).
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Recently, scholars have begun to offer critiques of actuarial sentencing that
temper its widespread appeal. For example, some have argued that incorporating
certain characteristics into the actuarial risk assessment algorithm, such as gen-
der, socioeconomic status, and characteristics that correlate with race, violates
Equal Protection. 12 Others have questioned whether actuarial risk assessment is
actually more accurate than clinical predictions. 126 The following discussion
identifies another reason to be cautious: these tools were not designed for sentenc-
ing purposes. This observation not only casts doubt on the laudatory descriptive
claims of actuarial sentencing proponents, but also reveals new normative con-
cems about this increasingly popular practice.
II. THE CORRECTIONAL ORIGINS OF ACTUARIAL SENTENCING
In some ways, the widespread enthusiasm for actuarial sentencing is unsurpris-
ing. As recounted in Part I, it emerges at a moment in U.S. criminal justice policy
when reformers are seeking to create smart, data-driven solutions to seemingly
intractable problems. And yet, for reasons this Part explores, such enthusiasm is
actually quite surprising because the actuarial tools at the center of this innova-
tion were designed for use at a different moment in the punishment process-
they were developed as guides for how to administer punishment after the terms
of the sentence had been established-and their creators explicitly warned they
were not intended for use at sentencing.
To bring this insight into focus, this Part begins with a genealogy of actua-
rial risk assessment practices. It reveals that these tools emerged and evolved
to address a specific problem: how to administer punishment efficiently and
effectively. It then demonstrates that these same tools are now being asked to
serve a different purpose, and one that their creator specifically warned
against-to determine how much punishment is due. 127 It contends that this
off-label application of actuarial risk assessment information to sentencing
decisions triggers an equally unintended, off-label theoretical justification.
Whereas the tools advance rehabilitation when used as directed in the correc-
tional context, in the sentencing context, the same tools are used to justify
decisions that embrace incapacitation.
125. See Starr, supra note 1, at 821-41 (arguing, inter alia, that the practice violates the Equal
Protection Clause; see also Melissa Hamilton, Risk-Needs Assessment: Constitutional and Ethical
Challenges, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 242 (2015) ("Risk-needs instruments utilize a plethora of factors
and characteristics to justify criminal justice decisions that may infringe upon fundamental rights or that
differentiate between various groups with respect to benefits or burdens. Both results implicate equal
protection issues.").
126. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
127. A separate and distinct development in the evolution of actuarial risk assessment is its
incorporation into bail decisions. See, e.g., Mayson, supra note 22, at 507-08 (describing the adoption of
actuarial risk assessment as the newest and "third wave of bail reform"). See supra note 22 for an
explanation of why that development will not be addressed here.
20181
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JouRNAL
A. CORRECTIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT: ASSESSING RISK TO ADMINISTER PUNISHMENT
Although sentencing authority is entrusted solely to judges,12 8 only correc-
tional authorities, including parole boards, are empowered to administer that sen-
tence. As the Supreme Court has recognized, courts are "ill equipped" to deal
with issues of prison administration.129 "Running a prison is an inordinately diffi-
cult undertaking that requires expertise, planning, and the commitment of resour-
ces, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and
executive branches of government."13 Thus, "separation of powers concerns
counsel a policy of judicial restraint" in interfering with how corrections depart-
ments administer punishment.131 For these reasons, after a judge imposes a sen-
tence, power and discretion shifts to the correctional agency to determine the
conditions of the defendant's confinement, such as where the defendant will be
imprisoned and what treatment programs (if any) to assign to the defendant.132
Although a sentencing court may make recommendations as to how punishment
is administered, "decisionmaking authority rests with the [Bureau of Prisons]."133
Nor may a sentencing court review the decisions of parole boards.
134
As this section establishes, actuarial risk assessment tools were developed to
guide these post-sentencing, punishment-administration decisions. They first
emerged for the narrow purpose of guiding parole decisions and considered only
a handful of factors. The tools were then expanded to inform a range of correc-
tional management tasks and, concomitantly, began to incorporate a significantly
longer list of factors.
1. Paroling Risk
The first actuarial risk assessment tools were developed in the 1970s for use by
parole boards and were intended to make parole decisions more consistent, pre-
dictable, and fair.135 Tools developed for this purpose attempt to assist parole
128. See supra Section I.A.2.
129. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987).
130. Id. at 84-85.
131. Id. at 85.
132. See, e.g., Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 331 (2011) (noting that the federal Bureau of
Prisons has "plenary control" over decisions pertaining to conditions of confinement after the judge
announces the sentence of a federal offender).
133. Id.
134. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364 (1989) (noting that correction officials
"possessed almost absolute discretion over the parole decision").
135. See Michael Tonry, Legal and Ethical Issues in the Prediction of Recidivism, 26 FED. SENT'G
REP. 167, 167-68 (2014) (discussing the 1970s' "shifts in attitudes and beliefs" that led to the
development of "prediction instruments" that could "take account of prisoners' prospects for law-
abidingness" with the goal of ultimately "mak[ing] decisions about punishment fairer, more consistent,
more predictable, and more transparent"); see also Hamilton, supra note 125, at 234 ("Initially,
evidence-based practices were adopted to inform post-conviction decisions and management strategies,
such as parole determinations, supervised release conditions, provision of reentry services, decisions to
revoke supervision, and judgments concerning probation and parole sanctions."); Simon, supra note 57,
at 399-400 ("Before the 1980s, [risk assessment] was used primarily in deciding who to release from
confinement.").
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boards in identifying the likelihood that a parole-eligible inmate would recidivate
if he or she were released on parole.136 Parole risk assessment tools tend to incor-
porate only static (unchangeable) recidivism risk factors, such as criminal history
or history of probation violations.137 For example, Connecticut uses the Salient
Factor Score (SFS) assessment, which was originally developed by the U.S.
Parole Commission for use in the federal system.138 The SFS considers the
following factors: number of prior commitments of sixty days or more, age at
commencement of current offense, recent commitment free period, prior court-
imposed term of imprisonment of more than one year, and use of violence in the
current or previous offenses.139
Significantly, those who created parole risk assessment tools intentionally
avoided incorporating into their calculations factors for which the offender bore
no responsibility, such as gender or race.14 And they originally incorporated, but
eventually abandoned, consideration of age at first offense and "status variables"
that were "heavily correlated with race," such as employment and education his-
tory, family characteristics, and residential status.141
2. Correcting Risk
Thus, actuarial recidivism prediction tools emerged in the 1970s to inform a
specific decision-parole-and considered a discrete number of factors. The
tools expanded significantly in the 1990s in three areas: (1) the type of decisions
they were used to inform, (2) the purpose of those decisions, and (3) the kinds
of information they incorporated into their prediction. 14 2 First, in contrast to pa-
role risk assessment tools, which focus on whether to release an individual, the
tools developed in the 1990s and onward-third- and fourth-generation risk
Social science literature counter-intuitively calls these "second generation" risk assessment tools. See
Hamilton, supra note 125, at 236-39 (describing four generations of risk assessment instruments). The
first generation of risk assessment is clinical risk assessment. Id. at 236. Popular examples of second-
generation tools are the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide, Static-99, and the federal Pre-Trial Risk
Assessment tool. Id. at 237.
136. See Tonry, supra note 135, at 168.
137. However, some jurisdictions have begun to incorporate dynamic factors into their parole risk
assessment. See SHAMIR RATANSI & STEPHEN M. COX, CONN. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS CTR.,
ASSESSMENT AND VALIDATION OF CONNECTICUT'S SALIENT FACTOR SCORE 10-11 (2007) (surveying
parole risk assessment practices of U.S. jurisdictions and Canada). For an explanation of the difference
between static and dynamic risk factors, see supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
138. RATANSI & COX, supra note 137, at 3.
139. See id. at 12.
140. See Tonry, supra note 135, at 168.
141. Id.
142. Although jurisdictions began to integrate actuarial risk assessment information into correctional
management decisions in the 1990s, the practice did not gain popularity until the last decade. VERA INST. OF
JUSTICE, CRT. ON SENTENCING & CORRS., MEMORANDUM TO DELAwARE JUSTICE REINVESTMENT TASK
FORCE, RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENTS 4 (Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.ma4jr.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/
10/vera-institute-memo-on-risk-assessment-for-delaware-2011.pdf [hereinafter VERA, DJRTF MEMO]. A
2010 national survey conducted by the Vera Institute of Justice identified sixty community supervision
agencies in forty-one states that used a risk assessment tool to assist with offender management. Id. Most of
these agencies-70%0-had implemented their tools since 2000, and one-third of those had adopted them
after 2005. Id.
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assessment instruments, as they are called in the social science literature 43-are
intended to guide decisions about how to manage an individual while he or she is
under correctional supervision. 144 Specifically, such tools are intended to inform
decisions relating to classification, placement, and programming for individuals
sentenced to a term of incarceration,1 45 and decisions relating to the supervision
of defendants sentenced to probation. 146 For example, they are used to help deter-
mine in what kind of facility an individual will be housed (for example, maxi-
mum, medium, or low security), 147 and what kind of treatment programs that
individual should complete during his or her term of supervision (for example,
educational, occupational, or behavioral programs).1 48
Two of the most popular risk assessment tools-the Level of Services Inquiry-
Revised (LSI-R) and the Correctional Offender Profiling for Alternative
Sanctions (COMPAS)-were developed in 1995 and 1998, respectively. 149 The
LSI-R describes itself as "a quantitative survey of offender attributes and their
situations relevant to level of supervision and treatment decisions." ' The
143. See Hamilton, supra note 125, at 237-39.
144. See infra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 753-54 (Wis. 2016) (describing the COMPAS
"risk-need assessment tool" used by the corrections department "when making placement decisions,
managing offenders, and planning treatment").
146. Indiana, for example, began using risk assessment to guide standards and recommendations for
probation departments in 1995. See Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 570 (Ind. 2010). California
adopted risk assessment in corrections as part of a realignment of its criminal sentencing procedures to
"prioritize limited probation resources" by establishing "an appropriate program of supervision" for
offenders. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., CRIMINAL LAW ADVISORY COMM., INVITATION TO
COMMENT: SPR17-27, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: USE OF RISK/NEEDS ASSESSMENTS AT SENTENCING 1
(2017), http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/SPR17-27.pdf; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a)(7)
(2011) (providing for a statewide "justice reinvestment strategy," defined as "a data-driven approach to
reduce corrections and related criminal justice spending and reinvest savings in strategies designed to
increase public safety" by "manag[ing] and allocat[ing] criminal justice populations more cost-
effectively"). And the Broward County, Florida Sheriff's Office began using COMPAS in 2008 to
determine levels of supervision. THOMAS BLOMBERG ET AL., VALIDATION OF THE COMPAS RISK
ASSESSMENT CLASSIFICATION INSTRUMENT 15 (2010), http://criminology.fsu.edu/wp-content/uploads/
Validation-of-the-COMPAS -Risk-Assessment-Classification-Instrument.pdf.
147. JAMES, supra note 30, at 4 ("Correctional authorities use risk assessment to make decisions
about the security level to which inmates will be assigned (e.g., a high, medium, low, or minimum
security facility.)").
148. See Tonry, supra note 135, at 171 (explaining that actuarial risk predictions can be used by
correctional agencies to direct individuals toward "educational, vocational, anger management,
cognitive skills, and parenting programs meant to target identified deficits"); see also Latessa & Lovins,
supra note 30, at 209 (explaining that correctional interventions should target "factors that are highly
correlated with criminal conduct," such as "substance abuse" and "antisocial attitudes").
149. See JAMES, supra note 30, at 25 (discussing the LSI-R's development in 1995). Northpointe
Institute for Public Management developed COMPAS in 1998. See NORTHPOINTE, supra note 43, at 2;
see also VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, CTR. ON SENTENCING & CORRS. MEMORANDUM TO ILLINOIS RISK
ASSETS AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT TASK FORCE 1 (May 27, 2010) https://www2.illinois.gov/idoc/
Documents/NationalInformationOffenderAssessmentsPartIlMemo.pdf (reporting results of a
national survey that found that the LSI-R is the "most commonly used generic tool" and noting that the
COMPAS tool was also "commonly used").
150. D.A. Andrews & James Bonta, LSI-R: Level of Service Inventory-Revised, MHS ASSESSMENTS,
https://www.mhs.com//MHS -Public safety?id= 153 [https://perma.cc/ULE9 -UX2D].
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COMPAS Practitioner's Guide explains that the tool was created "to provide
decisional support for the Department of Corrections when making placement
decisions, managing offenders, and planning treatment. "151
Second, in addition to expanding the site of the risk inquiry beyond parole to
supervision, classification, and treatment decisions, these newer tools added a
second step to the actuarial inquiry: risk reduction. Like parole assessment tools,
correctional risk assessment tools evaluate an individual's risk of recidivism; but
they also purport to identify particular recidivism risk factors or "criminogenic
needs" that correctional agents should address to reduce that risk.1 5 2 In other
words, they identify both the risk of recidivism and the dynamic factors that
should be targeted with correctional intervention to reduce that risk.
1 5 3
This process of risk identification and reduction emerged from social science
research of the Risk-Needs-Responsivity (RNR) principle.1 5 4 The risk principle
identifies who should be targeted for correctional intervention.1 5 5 This principle
emerged from research by social scientists Andrews, Bonta, and Hoge indicating
not only that correctional intervention decreases recidivism amongst higher risk
offenders, but also that such interventions actually increase recidivism rates
amongst low-risk offenders.1 5 6 Accordingly, the risk principle dictates that recidi-
vism reduction efforts should target those with the higher risk of recidivism,
whereas low-risk offenders should be "identified and excluded ... from intensive
correctional programs. "157
The need principle identifies what to target in the offender to reduce her risk of
recidivism.15 The principle dictates that correctional intervention should be
151. See State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749,754 (Wis. 2016) (citing COMPAS Practitioner's Guide).
152. See Monahan & Skeem, supra note 34, at 499 (distinguishing between tools that "are designed
exclusively to predict recidivism" from those that "are meant to inform risk reduction").
Because risk-identification tools were developed before tools that also engage in risk intervention,
risk-assessment literature typically refers to the former as second-generation risk-assessment tools and
the latter as third- and fourth-generation risk-assessment tools. See Hamilton, supra note 125, at 236-39.
153. See Hamilton, supra note 125, at 237-39 (describing third- and fourth-generation risk-
assessment tools). Many call this secondary task a "needs assessment," as it involves identifying the
subject's "criminogenic needs" or dynamic risk factors that may be amenable to intervention. See
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft 2017)
(describing the difference between "[n]eeds and risk assessment"); Gottfredson & Moriarty, supra note
113, at 192 (distinguishing between risk assessment, or "predicting who will or will not behave
criminally," and "needs assessment," which involves "using predictive methods to attempt a reduction
in criminality through assignment to differential treatments"). I refrain from using the phrase "needs
assessment" to avoid confusion.
154. See Latessa & Lovins, supra note 30, at 206-08.
155. Id.
156. See id. A meta analysis demonstrated that correctional intervention for high-risk offenders
decreased recidivism by nineteen percent and increased recidivism for low-risk offenders by four
percent. Id. at 207 fig.2. Prevailing explanations for this counterintuitive increase in recidivism in low-
risk offenders is that they are exposed to the "antisocial" attitudes of high-risk offenders in intensive
correctional interventions and that placing low-risk offenders in restrictive settings disrupts the factors
that make them low-risk, like a stable job and supportive community. Id. at 207-08.
157. Id. at 206-08.
158. See id. at 208-09.
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directed toward the offender's "criminogenic needs," also referred to as
"dynamic" (or changeable) risk factors.159 The "crime producing needs" that are
most commonly targeted for correctional intervention are substance abuse; anti-
social attitudes and association with antisocial peers; and lack of empathy, prob-
lem solving, and self control.160
The responsivity principle dictates how such correctional intervention should
be delivered.16 1 It suggests that treatment should be delivered in a way that is the
most accessible and engaging to the offender based on her mental and emotional
condition, level of motivation, and cognitive functioning.162 In sum, the RNR
principle aims to "assess[] an offender's risk of reoffending, match[] supervision
and treatment to the offender's risk level, and target[] the offender's criminogenic
needs or dynamic risk factors with the social learning and cognitive-behavioral
programs most likely to effect change in the offender's behavior." '163
Thus, as risk assessment expanded and evolved from parole to correctional
management, the purpose of the assessment also changed. For parole purposes,
actuarial risk assessment identifies recidivism risk as a proxy for public safety
risk. For correctional management purposes, as embodied in contemporary risk
assessment tools, risk is identified so that it can be reduced through appropriate
correction intervention.164 In service of this risk-reduction goal, correctional man-
agement risk assessment tools drastically increased the range of factors upon
which they base their recidivism prediction. Such tools explicitly incorporate
static risk factors that most parole assessment tools intentionally exclude, such as
age at first offense, gender, and history of family criminality.165 Moreover, they
also incorporate a range of other factors that are "dynamic," or factors that can (at
least in theory) be changed through either the passage of time or intervention,
such as employment status, marital status, current age, and educational
achievements.166
This broadening of the risk inquiry to include both static and dynamic factors
is said both to increase the accuracy of the risk prediction and help craft an effec-
tive management plan. 16 7 Criminologists Edward Latessa and Brian Lovins ana-
logize to assessing risk in the medical context to illustrate this point. They
explain that if you wanted to understand your risk for a heart attack, for example,
you would consider a range of static and dynamic factors, such as age, family
159. Id. at 209.
160. Id.
161. See JAMES, supra note 30, at 6.
162. Latessa & Lovins, supra note 30, at 210.
163. CASEY El AL., supra note 8, at 6.
164. Id.
165. See Hamilton, supra note 125, app. A at tbls. 2-3 (listing factors incorporated into various third-
and fourth-generation risk assessment tools, including LSI-R and COMPAS).
166. See id. Some scholarship and various tools identify the "dynamic risk factors" as the
"criminogenic needs." See, e.g., Monahan & Skeem, supra note 34, at 498. I will use the more direct
phrase "dynamic risk factors" or "dynamic factors" to avoid confusion.
167. See Latessa & Lovins, supra note 30, at 209 ("Combining static and dynamic factors together
give us the best picture of the overall risk of recidivism.").
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history, weight, and others.168 However, "to affect-and lower-your risk you
would focus on the dynamic ones.""'
3. Correctional Risk Assessment Principles: Use Only as Directed
Thus, actuarial risk assessment has evolved and expanded within the correc-
tional context. These expansive third- and fourth-generation correctional man-
agement tools are the same tools that are being integrated into sentencing
decisions.170 For example, Indiana uses the LSI-R,171 and Wisconsin uses
COMPAS. 17 2 Before moving on to scrutinize this new application, two principles
of correctional risk assessment require attention.
First, these tools were created to help correctional agents administer punish-
ment more effectively and efficiently, and their creators cautioned against their
use for other purposes. The creators of LSI-R, for example, specify that it "is not
a comprehensive survey of mitigating and aggravating factors relevant to crimi-
nal sanctioning and was never designed to assist in establishing the just pen-
alty. ' 173 Similarly, COMPAS was not designed for decisions "regarding
incarceration. "174 Thus, Wisconsin judges who receive COMPAS scores in
advance of sentencing are warned that "risk scores are not intended to determine
the severity of the sentence or whether an offender is incarcerated. ' 17 They must
also be notified of the other "limitations" of COMPAS, including that "COMPAS
was not developed for use at sentencing, but was intended for use by the
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. The only exception is Virginia, the only jurisdiction with a risk assessment "specific to the
purpose of sentencing." VERA, DEL. JRTF MEMO, supra note 142, at 10. Otherwise, all jurisdictions that
engage in actuarial sentencing use instruments designed for use in the correctional context, such as the
LSI-R, COMPAS, or state-specific correctional risk assessment tools. See id. (noting that Virginia is the
only jurisdiction with a risk assessment "specific to the purpose of sentencing"). However, although
Virginia's tool is specifically designed for use at sentencing, it operates in the same way as correctional
risk assessment tools. See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 83, at 12 (describing Virginia's risk assessment
process).
171. See Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 575 (Ind. 2010) (approving of the use of LSI-R at
sentencing).
172. See State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 757, 769, 772 (Wis. 2016) (upholding the use of
COMPAS at sentencing).
173. See Malenchik, 928 N.E.2d at 572 (quoting ANDREWS & BONTA, supra note 21, at 1) (emphasis
added).
174. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 756 (describing testimony of an expert witness about the COMPAS risk
assessment instrument); see also Angwin et al., supra note 66 (describing testimony of one of the
creators of COMPAS who said that the software was not created for sentencing; instead, his focus was
on reducing crime, not punishment, and he "wanted [it] to stay away from the courts"); Anthony W.
Flores et al., False Positives, False Negatives, and False Analyses: A Rejoinder to "Machine Bias:
There's Software Used Across the Country to Predict Future Criminals. And It's Biased Against
Blacks," 80 FED. PROB. 38, 39 (2016) (critiquing the study of Angwin et al., supra note 66, which found
COMPAS racially biased because it was tested on pretrial defendants and "was not designed for use on
pretrial defendants" but was rather "developed upon and for individuals on post-disposition
supervision").
175. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 768.
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Department of Corrections in making determinations regarding treatment, super-
vision, and parole.
176
Second, these tools are intended to help correctional agents administer punish-
ment in a way that reduces recidivism. Indeed, as per the RNR principle, risk is
identified so that it can be reduced through correctional intervention. The RNR
principle is intrinsically democratic: risk is identified for every offender so that it
may be reduced through effective and appropriate rehabilitative programming.
Of course, this principle is not necessarily democratically actualized: rehabilita-
tive resources are limited and may not be allotted consistent with the RNR princi-
ple. But at least in theory, if not in practice, the RNR principle should lead to
investment in the rehabilitation of all offenders.
177
According to this principle, the mechanism for recidivism reduction is the pro-
vision of services, supervision requirements, and programming aimed at the
offender's particular risk factors. Somewhat counterintuitively, the RNR princi-
ple should lead to more investment in the rehabilitation of high-risk offenders;
178
those who are a higher risk of recidivism should receive more intensive and tar-
geted programming, supervision, and treatment requirements, all of which are
resource intensive. Meanwhile, low-risk offenders need little by way of rehabili-
tation. In fact, intensive and restrictive programming for low-risk offenders has
been deemed criminogenic-it may increase the likelihood they will reoffend.
179
Thus, the RNR principle may dictate that low-risk offenders receive little rehabil-
itative investment. But this lack of investment is perfectly consistent with the
RNR principle: fewer resources are dedicated to low-risk offenders because it
will increase their likelihood of future desistance.180
Undoubtedly, corrections officials wield great power over those who are under
their supervision, and they use the risk assessment information to make decisions
that increase or decrease the severity of an individual's conditions of confine-
ment. For example, an individual who receives a low-risk score may be placed in
a low-security facility that allows them to go into the community for work
release. Conversely, an inmate who receives a high risk score may have greater
restrictions placed on his movement within the facility or be required to attend
more onerous treatment programs.181 Yet, when high-risk offenders receive more
intensive programming and low-risk offenders receive less based on their risk
score, it is not because they deserve more or less sanction. Rather, it is because
correctional intervention-or lack thereof, for low-risk offenders-is believed to
176. Id. at 769-70 (emphasis added).
177. See supra Section II.A.2.
178. See Latessa & Lovins, supra note 30, at 207.
179. Id. at 207-08.
180. Id.
181. See James Austin, The Proper and Improper Use of Risk Assessment in Corrections, 16 FED.
SENT'G REP. 194, 196 (2004) (recommending that inmates who pose a high risk of reoffending be
assigned to restrictive housing units, receive intensive treatment services, or both).
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decrease their likelihood of recidivism in the future. 18 2 In other words, it is done
to correct their risk level. As Latessa and Lovins explain, "[w]hen we are able to
identify the higher risk offender, providing an appropriate correctional response
that can reduce that risk, we have achieved a level of public protection through
risk reduction. 
183
B. ACTUARIAL SENTENCING: ASSESSING RISK TO DETERMINE PUNISHMENT
Despite the clear admonishments that actuarial risk assessment tools should be
used only as directed, many jurisdictions are nevertheless beginning to incorpo-
rate them into sentencing decisions. 84 This section describes how actuarial sen-
tencing employs these tools in ways that depart from their intended, on-label
design. It identifies two points of departure: (1) the decisions such tools are used
to support and (2) the theoretical justifications for those decisions.
1. Going "Off-Label" in Practice: Sentencing Risk
As delineated in Part I, actuarial risk information has been applied in two
sentencing-specific contexts: decisions about sentence length and sentence loca-
tion. 85 This section contends that both of these decisions are decisions about the
severity of the sentence and are therefore off-label applications of this risk
information.
The decision about the length of a defendant's sentence is a decision about its
severity. Perhaps because it so directly undermines the warning that risk assess-
ment information should not be used to determine the severity of the sentence,
this sentence-length use-and particularly the possibility of using a high-risk
score to increase a defendant's sentence-has been met with much more circum-
spection than the sentence location decision. For example, the Model Penal Code
"encourages the use of actuarial risk-assessment instruments as a regular part of
the felony sentencing process" '86 and authorizes using actuarial information to
guide decisions about both sentence location and length, as discussed above.187
Yet, the drafters recommend actuarial tools with significantly less enthusiasm for
the latter purpose, particularly for high-risk offenders, stressing that they do not
"mandat[e]" or "encourag[e]" using actuarial risk information to increase the
length of an offender's sentence.1 88
182. See Latessa & Lovins, supra note 30, at 216 (arguing that risk assessment improves public
safety by reducing recidivism).
183. Id.
184. See, e.g., State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 759 (Wis. 2016) (noting that risk assessment tools
like COMPAS "were designed for use by those within the Department of Corrections" but are "being
transitioned to a sentencing venue governed by different guiding principles").
185. See supra Section I.A.2.
186. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final
Draft 2017).
187. See supra notes 54-56, 79.
188. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft
2017).
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Many proponents of actuarial sentencing attempt to reconcile this conflict
between the intended and applied use of actuarial recidivism predictions by dis-
tinguishing decisions about the severity of the sentence from decisions about
where a defendant will serve his sentence. Such proponents claim that using risk
information to impose community-based sentences on probation-eligible defend-
ants is not a decision that impacts the severity of the sentence, and they limit their
support to this use. In so doing, they purport to be in conformity with the
intended, on-label use for which these tools were created. The National Center
for State Courts (NCSC), for example, claims that actuarial risk information
"should not be used as an aggravating or mitigating factor in determining the se-
verity of an offender's sanction."18 9 Yet at the same time, NCSC has wholeheart-
edly endorsed the use of actuarial information to guide sentencing decisions
about where probation-eligible defendants should serve their sentences.190
The Wisconsin Supreme Court drew a similar distinction between incarcera-
tion decisions and sentence severity in State v. Loomis, discussed above.191 In
Loomis, the actuarial risk information was conveyed to the judge in a presentence
report, which cautioned that "it is very important to remember that risk scores
are not intended to determine the severity of the sentence or whether an offender
is incarcerated."'192 The court claimed it was "in accord with" this limitation193
and held that risk information may not be used "to determine whether an offender
is incarcerated" or "the severity of the sentence." '194 Nonetheless, the court upheld
the judge's consideration of actuarial information to determine that it would sen-
tence Mr. Loomis to incarceration instead of probation.19
Thus, the rationale circulated by the NCSC and Loomis implies that the judge's
decision whether a defendant will serve his sentence in community or institu-
tional supervision is not a decision about the severity of the sentence or "whether
[a defendant] is incarcerated." '196 In other words, using actuarial risk information
to guide decisions about where a defendant will serve her sentence is not an off-
label use.
This distinction, however, collapses under scrutiny. When a judge is deciding
whether a probation-eligible defendant will serve his sentence in an incarcerative
or community setting, she is assessing whether he can be supervised safely and
effectively in the community. If the answer, guided by the risk information, is af-
firmative, the defendant may serve his sentence in the community; on the other
hand, if the risk information suggests the defendant poses a high risk of
189. CASEY Er AL., supra note 8, at 11.
190. Id. at 13-14 (recommending that courts consider risk assessment information in determining
whether to sentence a defendant to community supervision).
191. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
192. State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 760 (Wis. 2016) (emphasis added) (quoting the presentence
investigation report).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 769.
195. Id. at 767.
196. Id. at 769.
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recidivism, the judge may decide the defendant should serve his sentence in an
incarcerative setting. In such a scenario, the judge is using risk information to
guide a decision about whether to incarcerate the defendant. The facts of Loomis
illustrate this point. The circuit court referenced Mr. Loomis's "extremely high"
risk score as a reason for ruling out probation.1 97 In other words, the court used
the risk information as a basis for sentencing Mr. Loomis to prison instead of
community supervision.
Moreover, decisions about where a defendant will serve his sentence directly
impact the severity of the sentence. Certainly, the requirements of probation can
be quite onerous. They can include requirements that the defendant wear an elec-
tronic monitoring device, check in frequently with a probation officer, allow the
probation officer to enter his residence without advance notice, abide by a curfew,
and attend drug treatment, mental health, and/or educational programming.19
Yet, few would contest that a sentence served in a non-incarcerative setting is
less severe than one served in a setting in which one's liberty is completely cir-
cumscribed. Furthermore, according to the approach followed in some jurisdic-
tions, the decision about where a probation-eligible defendant will serve his
sentence is intertwined with decisions about the length of sentence. In Virginia
and under the Model Penal Code, for example, a prison-bound defendant with a
low risk score may be sentenced to community-based supervision or a shorter jail
sentence.199
Thus, arguments that sentence-location decisions are not decisions about the
severity of a sentence are unavailing. Moreover, sentence-location decisions are
often intertwined with the paradigmatic determination of sentence severity, the
decision about the length of a sentence.
2. Going "Off-Label" in Theory: Incapacitating Risk
When used as directed, actuarial risk instruments help correctional agents
administer punishment and do so in a way that attempts to rehabilitate individuals
under their control. Actuarial sentencing proponents promise that this practice
similarly advances rehabilitative goals.2 ° ° However, as this section explains, the
incorporation of actuarial information into sentencing also triggers an unintended
theoretical justification: the incapacitation of defendants.
When used for the off-label, sentencing-specific purposes identified above,
actuarial risk information is used to set the terms of that punishment. This use is a
more complex inquiry that requires a more complex consideration of the risk of
197. Id. at 755.
198. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (2012) (listing mandatory and discretionary conditions of probation);
ROGER K. WARREN, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, A BRIEF MEMO ON PROBATION CONDITIONS, http://www.
ncsc.org/-/media/Microsites/Files/CSI/Additional%20Leaming%20Materials/Handout%2024%20Probation
%20Conditions.ashx [https://perma.cc/F5CP-YU6L] (describing common monitoring, treatment, and
control conditions of probation).
199. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09(3) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft
2017); VA. CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 38, at 87.
200. See supra Section I.B.1.
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future behavior. When determining the severity of punishment, judges must con-
sider not just whether the future behavior is likely to occur, but also whether the
risk of future behavior justifies additional sanction. In other words, their decision
must resound in a theory of punishment." 1
Many jurisdictions permit or require judges to consider multiple theories of
punishment-retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation-in deter-
mining a just sentence.22 The purpose of predicting a defendant's future behavior
at sentencing varies depending on which theory of punishment is being used.
Generally, theories of punishment fall into one of two categories: retributive or
utilitarian.
20 3
Retributive theory is backward-looking, concerned only with matching the
punishment to the conduct giving rise to criminal offense; the offender should get
his or her "just deserts" and nothing more.20 4 From this perspective, "punishment
is directed at imposing merited harm upon the criminal for his wrong, and not at
the achievement of social benefits."2 0 The greater the harm, the greater the penal
sanction.20 6 Future conduct, including future criminal behavior, is thus irrelevant
to retributive theories of punishment. Risk prediction is "anathema" to the
retributivist perspective-it is "an unacceptable basis for suspending the liberty
of a person who does not otherwise deserve prison as punishment. "207
On the other hand, prediction of future conduct is central to utilitarian theories
of punishment, which justify punishment by its social utility in increasing public
safety.208 All three utilitarian theories of punishment-rehabilitation, deterrence,
and incapacitation-justify punishment as a means of decreasing future harm and
increasing public safety. They differ, however, in how they strive to attain that
shared goal of public safety maximization. Rehabilitation seeks to prevent future
criminal activity and increase public safety through treatment or programming,
such as drug treatment, anger management, or behavioral therapy, that targets the
201. See Sidhu, supra note 17, at 730 ("The theories of punishment ... suggest that the level of
correctional intervention should flow from the reasons why the state may legitimately impose
punishment on an individual. Those reasons dictate an alternative set of values that are in tension with
the pragmatic benefits of risk-assessment tools.").
202. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) (directing federal judges to "consider... the need for the
sentence imposed" to advance the goals of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation).
203. See Sidhu, supra note 17, at 682-83, 730-31 (describing common theories of punishment).
204. Id. at 677; see also George P. Fletcher, The Recidivist Premium, 1 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 54, 56
(1982) ("Retributivists hold generally that punishment should be a fitting response to the defendant's
crime.").
205. Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an Articulated
Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1315-16 (2000).
206. See generally id. (discussing the role of the degree of harm caused in assessing an offender's
punishment under a retributivist framework).
207. Simon, supra note 57, at 403; see also Starr, supra note 1, at 818 (explaining that risk prediction
is irrelevant to the retributive perspective). But see Youngjae Lee, Recidivism as Omission: A Relational
Account, 87 TEx. L. REv. 571, 576-77 (2009) (noting that retributivists are generally critical of
recidivist enhancement statutes, but articulating a "retributivist defense" of the recidivist premium).
208. See Sidhu, supra note 17, at 678; see also Cotton, supra note 205, at 1316.
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root causes of criminal behavior.2 9 Deterrence aims to curb future criminal activ-
ity by threatening or imposing punishment severe enough that would-be offenders
will refrain from such activity to avoid that punishment.210 Incapacitation
theory also seeks to prevent future criminal activity, but through a different
mechanism-by removing the potential offender from the community. Toward
that end, incapacitation theory relies heavily on the instrumental benefit of
incarceration.211 Indeed, according to incapacitation theory, "[i]f the prison
can do nothing else .... it can detain offenders for a time and thus delay their
resumption of criminal activity. "212
These three utilitarian theories justify different mechanisms by which punish-
ment should reduce recidivism: rehabilitation by reforming the individual so they
do not commit additional crimes; deterrence by scaring the individual so they
comply with the law; and incapacitation by rendering the individual physically
incapable of reoffending in the community through incarceration.213
As discussed above, actuarial sentencing is marketed in utilitarian terms as a
primarily rehabilitative intervention. The risk information will help judges craft a
sentence that will respond to the offender's criminogenic risk factors, reducing
the likelihood that they will commit future crimes. 214 However, when used for the
off-label, sentencing-specific purposes identified in Part I-that is, when used to
inform decisions regarding the length and location of a sentence-actuarial sen-
tencing resonates strongly in incapacitation.
Actuarial sentencing justifies imposing an incarceratory sentence instead of a
community-based sentence and extending the amount of time for which the indi-
vidual is incarcerated in the name of public safety. When a judge considers recidi-
vism risk to set the location and length of a defendant's sentence, the judge is
essentially asking whether there is too great a chance that the individual will reof-
fend if sentenced to a nonincarcerative sentence. Thus, if the person has a rela-
tively low risk of recidivism, she may serve her sentence in the community
without endangering the public; if she is a high risk, she should be incapacitated
to protect the public from the harm caused by the crime she may commit in the
future. And, if she is a particularly high risk, she should be incapacitated for a lon-
ger term to maximize the public safety benefit.
A few actuarial sentencing proponents have recognized that the practice impli-
cates incapacitation instead of, or in addition to, rehabilitation. The Model Penal
209. See Sidhu, supra note 17, at 679.
210. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT 19 (Robert Heward 1917)
(1830) (identifying "two branches" of deterrence theory: "[p]articular prevention, which applies to the
delinquent himself; and general prevention, which is applicable to all members of the community
without exception").
211. Cotton, supra note 205, at 1316 ("Incapacitation uses imprisonment to remove the offender
from society to protect it from the danger he poses.").
212. Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of
Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 458 (1992).
213. See Monahan & Skeem, supra note 34, at 492 (describing utilitarian theories of punishment).
214. See supra Section I.B.1.
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Code reporters candidly acknowledge that incapacitation provides the strongest
justification for integrating actuarial risk information into decisions about where
a defendant will serve her sentence. "Risk assessments," they contend, "are most
easily justified when used to identify otherwise prison-bound offenders whose
confinement will likely serve no incapacitative purpose.""' In other words, a low
risk score indicates that the defendant does not need to be separated from the
community to protect the public; she can safely serve her sentence in the
community.
The flip side of this reasoning, of course, is that a high risk score supports a de-
cision that the defendant should be incarcerated-and perhaps for a longer term
-to protect the public. The Model Penal Code reporters also acknowledge, albeit
hesitantly, that the use of actuarial risk information to extend a sentence resonates
in incapacitory logic.216 Though they deny that the model provision is motivated
by a determination that it is "desirable to expand the use of risk assessment as a
basis for longer incarceration terms," the reporters nonetheless admit that the
Model Code "permit[s] the use of actuarial offender risk assessments as a basis
for punishments more severe than offenders would otherwise have received. 2 17
This practice is justified, they explain, by its utility in increasing public safety:
high-risk offenders can be sentenced to "crime-preventive terms of confinement"
to prevent future victimizations.218 This justification echoes the reasoning of
researchers Peter Imrey and A. Philip Dawid, who characterize actuarial risk
assessment's ability to distinguish "groups of individuals with high and low pro-
pensities for violence recidivism" as a "great benefit." '219 If courts act on these
distinctions, Imrey and David claim, "recidivism will decline to the extent that
groups most prone to violence are incapacitated. 220
Thus, though it is popularly marketed as an approach that will revive rehabili-
tative aims within the criminal justice system, actuarial risk assessment, when
used to guide sentencing decisions, triggers an off-label theory: incapacitation.
Indeed, the justifications articulated by the Model Penal Code reporters and by
scholars above directly invoke the traditional incapacitative justification for
incarceration. On their view, incarceration delays future criminal activity and, "if
such delays are sustained for enough time and for enough offenders, significant
aggregate effects in crime can take place although individual destinies are only
marginally altered.' '221
This observation may, without more, cause concern for some. Indeed,
incapacitation-inspired sentencing schemes that justify lengthy incarceratory
215. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft 2017)
(emphasis added).
216. See id. § 6B.09 cmt. e.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Peter B. Imrey & A. Philip Dawid, A Commentary on Statistical Assessment of Violence
Recidivism Risk, 2 STATS. & PUB. POL'Y 25, 40 (2015).
220. Id.
221. Feeley & Simon, supra note 212, at 458.
[Vol. 107:57
PUNISHING RISK
sentences in the name of public safety, such as "three strikes" laws and recid-
ivist enhancement statutes, are beginning to fall out of favor because they
have contributed to the rise of mass incarceration.22 2 Perhaps this concern is
unfounded if, as actuarial sentencing proponents claim, the practice will
reduce the instances in which judges resort to incapacitory logic. The follow-
ing Part, however, casts doubt on this possibility.
III. THE PROBLEMS OF ACTUARIAL SENTENCING
The observation that actuarial sentencing requires an unintended and unap-
proved use of actuarial risk information does not, on its own, render the practice
intrinsically wrong or detrimental. Indeed, the off-label use of certain medicines,
for example, is quite common and often beneficial.223 Actuarial sentencing may
be desirable, despite its off-label nature, if it nevertheless delivers what its propo-
nents promise: a mechanism for refining the risk inquiry at sentencing that ulti-
mately reduces incarceration. Perhaps, as its proponents claim, actuarial risk
assessment simply helps judges do what they should be doing at sentencing and
helps them winnow the number of cases in which they determine incarceration is
warranted.224
This Part reexamines those claims in light of the foregoing analysis and reveals
a disjuncture between the promise and practice of actuarial sentencing. It con-
tends that actuarial sentencing expands and distorts, rather than refines, how risk
should be defined and measured at sentencing. Consequently, it cautions that
actuarial sentencing can lead to greater reliance on incarceration, and for reasons
that are antithetical to traditional sentencing principles.
A. QUESTIONING THE BENEFIT
As discussed in Part I, actuarial sentencing is marketed as a cost-saving
reform.2 25 Its proponents focus on the promise of accurately distinguishing those
who are unlikely to recidivate from "dangerous" offenders and expending carc-
eral resources only on the latter. Society thus saves money in the short term
because it avoids the cost of incarcerating those who will not reoffend and in the
long term because these offenders are rehabilitated.
Given its employment of data to produce economic efficiency though selec-
tive rehabilitation, actuarial sentencing can be classified as an example of a
222. See, e.g., Jonathan Simon, Positively Punitive: How the Inventor of Scientific Criminology Who
Died at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century Continues to Haunt American Crime Control at the
Beginning of the Twenty-First, 84 TEx. L. REv. 2135, 2168-70 (2006) (noting the "incapacitative
thrust" of recidivist laws and other law and policies adopted as part of the "War on Crime").
223. See supra note 22. See generally Wittich et al., supra note 22 (discussing the prevalence of
prescribing medicine in "off-label" ways).
224. See supra Section I.B.2.
225. See supra Section I.B.3.
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"neorehabilitative" reform effort.22 6 Neorehabilitation revives and revises tradi-
tional rehabilitation principles. This new paradigm of criminal justice reform
replaces the egalitarian impulse of traditional rehabilitative measures-which
seek to rehabilitate all offenders for the offender's sake-with an approach that is
"cautious and selective, [and] attentive to the need for evidence of efficacy, cost
effectiveness, and success. 2 27 The animating impetus of the neorehabilitative
movement is to relieve the fiscal strain on the penal system that has resulted from
decades of tough-on-crime, incapacitory policies that contributed to the era of
mass incarceration.2 28 Toward that end, neorehabilitiative reforms employ social
science data and predictive tools to select candidates for rehabilitation and divert
them from incarceration, thus reserving scarce carceral resources for those
who remain.229 In other words, neorehabilitation rehabilitates rehabilitation with
an eye toward economic efficiency.230 The current roster of neorehabilitative
reforms includes: problem-solving courts and other alternatives to incarceration
programs;231 reforms to early release and parole revocation programs;232 and,
now, actuarial sentencing.
Scholars have begun to critique the basic premise of neorehabilitative reforms.
For example, the myopic emphasis on saving money eclipses other, non-mone-
tary values that the criminal justice system purports to protect, such as equity and
fairness.2 33 Moreover, neorehabilitative reforms may partially relieve the fiscal
burden on the system while leaving its structural flaws intact.234 Such reforms
are, in other words, merely release-valve reforms that may enable the broken sys-
tem to operate in perpetuity.23 Thus, even if actuarial sentencing operates as
promised and ultimately provides monetary savings, perhaps the practice of
selecting some defendants for rehabilitative intervention based on actuarial pre-
diction is normatively unsound.
Furthermore, the following analysis should give pause even to those who
support this and other fiscally-focused reform efforts. Scrutinizing the off-
label application of corrections-based tools to sentencing practices casts
doubt on whether actuarial sentencing can deliver the fiscal savings it prom-
ises. In fact, actuarial sentencing can lead to more, not less, reliance on
226. See Jessica M. Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation, 66 SMU L. REV. 189, 199-203 (2013)
(describing neorehabilitation); Eric J. Miller, Drugs, Courts, and the New Penology, 20 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 417,441 (2009) (same).
227. Mary D. Fan, Beyond Budget-Cut Criminal Justice: The Future of Penal Law, 90 N.C. L. REV. 581,
633 (2012). Professor Fan calls this approach "rehabilitation pragmatism" instead of "neorehabiltiation." Id.
at 585.
228. See Eaglin, supra note 226, at 199-202.
229. See id.
230. See id. at 189.
231. See id. at 208-09; see also Collins, supra note 97, at 1498-99 (identifying problem-solving
courts as neorehabilitative reforms).
232. See Eaglin, supra note 226, at 203-09.
233. See generally id.
234. See Collins, supra note 97, at 1508-09.
235. Id. at 1508.
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incarceration-a possibility that results from a disjuncture between the level
of risk that justifies incarceration and the definition of risk embraced in actua-
rial risk assessment.
Given the expense of incarceration, investing in incarceration instead of com-
munity supervision is only a sound economic decision if the harm prevented is
severe.236 To justify incarceration instead of community supervision, or to justify
an extension of incarceration in the name of public safety, the defendant's pre-
dicted conduct should pose the risk of more than a de minimis harm to the public.
In short, the defendant should be dangerous. 7
Although the concept of "future dangerousness" has received significant scru-
tiny from scholars and jurists in the context of capital sentencing, the level of
"dangerousness" that justifies incapacitation for non-capital cases remains some-
what amorphous. 8 When defendants have raised due process challenges to sen-
tencing enhancements based on "future dangerousness," courts have rebuffed
their claims by noting that the practice is common, and often with reference to
Jurek v. Texas, in which the Supreme Court upheld "future dangerousness" as an
aggravating factor for the imposition of the death penalty. 9
For decades, the mere possibility of any future criminal activity seems to have
satisfied this "dangerousness" requirement. Recidivist sentencing statutes, for
example, equate recidivism risk and risk to the public, and justify increasing the
severity of sanctions for repeat offenders to prevent future offending.240 As the
Supreme Court explained in Rummel v. Estelle, recidivist enhancement statutes
seek to "deter repeat offenders" and "segregate" them from society due to the
"propensities [they have] demonstrated over a period of time. 241 Such statutes
can justify drastic increases in sentences based on relatively innocuous behavior,
such as a series of low-level thefts, in the name of public safety. The Texas statute
at issue in Rummel illustrates this dynamic.242 Texas's recidivist enhancement
236. George Fletcher points out that the justification for a recidivist sentencing premium requires that
the prediction be accurate; we need to know the probability that person will offend again to determine
whether the social benefit of preventing future crime outweighs the moral and monetary costs of
incarceration. Fletcher, supra note 204, at 55 (noting that utilitarians contend that those who have done
wrong once are "likely to do so in the future"). In other words, if we are simply predicting that the
person is going to commit a low-level property crime, the cost of incarceration does not justify the
public safety gain. See generally Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and Dangerous
Blameless Offenders, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 693, 698 (1993) ("Where the threatened harm is
serious, incapacitation will be achieved through incarceration.").
237. Robinson, supra note 236, at 710-11 ("Dangerousness is the rationale and the criterion for
special extended terms of incarceration for habitual offenders.").
238. Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Recognizing Constitutional Rights at Sentencing,
99 CAL. L. REv. 47, 73 (2011) (discussing the "few cases" in which defendants have raised due process
challenges to judicial findings of future dangerousness in non-capital cases). Interestingly, this same
case-Jurek v. Texas-is often cited to support actuarial sentencing. See supra notes 108-12 and
accompanying text.
239. Hessick & Hessick, supra note 238, at 73.
240. See ROBERTS, supra note 34, at 7-8 (describing the theoretical justifications for recidivist
sentencing enhancements).
241. 445 U.S. 263, 284 (1980).
242. See id. at 264.
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statute provided that anyone who was convicted of three non-capital felonies
"shall on such third conviction be imprisoned for life." '243 Mr. Rummel was con-
victed of felony theft for forging a check in the amount of $120.75.244 Because he
had previously been convicted of two prior theft-related felonies, for offenses
involving $80 and $28.36, respectively, he was sentenced under the recidivist
statute to life in prison.245
Although this practice has withstood constitutional scrutiny, 246 there is grow-
ing skepticism of its purported public safety rationale and its advisability as a
matter of public policy. 24 7 As a result, some jurisdictions are beginning to soften
or reverse these harsh sentencing practices.248 Indeed, the concern that we expend
too many resources incarcerating those who do not present a true "danger" to the
public has recently united reformers across the political spectrum and motivates
many contemporary criminal justice reform efforts, including actuarial sentenc-
ing. 21 Reform advocates commonly point to statistics revealing that a significant
portion of the prison population are low-level, nonviolent criminal offenders, and
argue that their continued incarceration is unnecessary because they do not
threaten public safety.250 In other words, many criminal justice reform advocates
agree that the mere possibility of future criminal activity of unspecified severity
does not justify incarceration.21 Rather, scarce penal resources should be used
for those who have committed high-level or violent offenses-that is, those who
may pose a more severe threat to public safety.
Counterintuitively, however-and despite proponents' claims to the contrary-
actuarial sentencing actually broadens, rather than restricts, the type of risk that
may justify resorting to incapacitation. Actuarial tools do not predict precisely.
They define risk broadly, without parsing how one is likely to recidivate. 2 Risk,
as measured by most of the actuarial sentencing instruments, is the general risk of
recidivism; these tools predict the likelihood an offender will commit a crime of
243. Id.
244. See id. at 265-66.
245. See id.
246. See id. at 268.
247. See generally Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REv. 1, 2-
4 (discussing calls from courts, politicians, conservative commentators, and the public for reform to
harsh sentencing practices).
248. See, e.g., Erik Luna, Mandatory Minimums, in 4 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PUNISHMENT,
INCARCERATION, AND RELEASE 117, 122-24 (Erik Luna ed., 2017) (discussing recent reforms to
mandatory minimum polices, including California's "three strikes" recidivist sentencing enhancement
statute).
249. See, e.g., JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., How MANY AMERICANS ARE
UNNECESSARILY INCARCERATED? 7 (2016) (finding that thirty-nine percent of federal and state prisoners
are "incarcerated with little public safety rationale" and identifying cost savings of their release); The
Conservative Case for Reform, RIGHT ON CRIME, http://rightoncrime.com/the-conservative-case-for-
reform/ [https://perma.cc/S4XN-AN5A] (last visited Aug. 8, 2018) ("At a time of tight budgets in state
capitols and households alike, it is time for innovative policy approaches that maximize the public safety
return on our investment of taxpayers' dollars.").
250. See, e.g., AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 249, at 27, 29-30.
251. See, e.g., id. at 42, 46.
252. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
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any severity, ranging from a low-level property crime or even a violation of proba-
tion to more serious crimes against the person. And some tools also capture the
possibility that an individual will simply be arrested for, but not necessarily
charged with (let alone convicted of), future criminal conduct. Thus, those who
are deemed particularly "risky" may not be particularly "dangerous." One may
earn the label of a "high-risk" offender simply because they (or more accurately,
people who share their characteristics) 2 3 are statistically more likely to commit or
be arrested for a low-level offense in the subsequent years. Nevertheless, actuarial
sentencing would support and perhaps even encourage incarcerating this high-risk
offender or extending her sentence in the name of public safety. Thus, as Jonathan
Simon has noted, modern risk assessment has transformed "[t]he question of dan-
gerousness.., into one of risk more generally.
2 4
In this way, actuarial sentencing conflates a general risk of recidivism with
dangerousness. In so doing, it may encourage incapacitation of a broad swath of
the population-not because they are dangerous, but because they are purportedly
more likely to commit or be rearrested for an inarguably low-level offense. In
light of the imprecision of this prediction, it may be impossible to predict, let
alone promise, true cost savings.
Moreover, the actuarial risk algorithms are themselves imprecise, intrinsically
risk-averse, and conservative. A meta-analysis of the accuracy of the risk instru-
ments found that they predict recidivism at a "moderate" or "above chance"
level.25 The most favorable studies suggest they predict with "about 70% accu-
racy.'216 Some have questioned whether the tools are actually more accurate than
risk predictions that are "clinical," that is, predictions made based on experience,
or "gut feeling," without the assistance of an actuarial tool. 25 7 A 2018 study by
computer scientists at Dartmouth College casts even further doubt on the utility of
the risk assessment instruments. It found that individals who completed an online
survey were able to predict recidivism risk about as accurately as the COMPAS
risk instrument.25 8 One of the researchers described their findings as follows:
"There was essentially no difference between people responding to an online sur-
vey for a buck and this commercial software being used in the courts. '"259
253. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
254. Simon, supra note 57, at 414.
255. JAMES, supra note 30, 3 & n.17 (noting, based on a meta-analysis of the accuracy of risk
assessment instruments, that they estimate at a "moderate" or "above chance" level of accuracy).
256. See Latessa & Lovins, supra note 30, at 212 ("Even with large data sets and advanced analytical
techniques, the best models are usually able to predict recidivism with about 70% accuracy ... provided
it is completed by trained staff."); see also Dressel & Farid, supra note 15, at 3 (finding sixty-five
percent accuracy).
257. See, e.g., Starr, supra note 1, at 853-55 (reviewing accuracy studies of actuarial risk tools and
concluding that "the shibboleth that actuarial prediction outperforms clinical prediction is ... a
generalization that is not true in every case").
258. See Dressel & Farid, supra note 15, at 3.
259. Issie Lapowsky, Crime-Predicting Algorithms May Not Fare Much Better than Untrained
Humans, WIRED (Jan. 17, 2018, 2:16 PM) (quoting Hany Farid), https://www.wired.com/story/crime-
predicting-algorithms-may-not-outperform-untrained-humans/ [https://perma.cc/69NC-V2C6].
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At the very least, then, these tools will be wrong thirty percent of the time, and
in one of two ways: by falsely identifying an offender who does not commit a
future offense as presenting a high risk of recidivism (false positive), or by falsely
identifying an offender who commits a future offense as presenting a low risk of
recidivism (false negative).260 The tools err on the side of overestimating risk
because the "cost" of a false negative -the individual who is deemed a low risk
but then commits a future offense-is believed to outweigh that of a false posi-
tive. Latessa and Lovins claim, for example, "False negatives are more visible
and damaging because they can actually involve new offenses that cause harm to
victims and jeopardize public safety. False negatives are potentially very costly;
hence most assessment strategies err on the conservative side." '26 1
Given the conservative nature of this estimate, some individuals who do not
pose a high risk of recidivism are nevertheless identified as such. When the risk
assessment is completed in the correctional context, many easily dismiss the cost
of an erroneous false positive prediction. If one is erroneously identified as posing
a low risk of recidivism, she will not receive sufficient correctional intervention;
her risk level will not be corrected, and she will commit additional crimes,
thereby jeopardizing public safety. In contrast, if she is erroneously identified as
posing a high risk of recidivism, according to the Risk-Need-Responsivity (RNR)
principle, she should receive more intensive treatment than she actually needs-a
higher level of supervision, more programming requirements, and more reporting
requirements if she is sentenced to probation. These costs are hardly inconse-
quential. As the risk principle dictates, intervention for one who is actually low-
risk may be criminogenic. Moreover, the more conditions placed on an offender,
the greater the possibility that he or she will not be able to satisfy them.262
Crucially, however, in the correctional context, this overprediction of recidi-
vism risk cannot enhance or extend the default terms of the sentence itself,
namely where the defendant serves his sentence and the length of that sentence.
For example, if the judge sentences a defendant to probation, the correctional
agent may administer the RNR principle when determining probation require-
ments and may, based on the conservative risk estimate, erroneously assign more
restrictive requirements than are necessary. That agent may not, however, use the
risk assessment information to override the judge's decision and incarcerate the
defendant instead of supervising him on probation.
In the sentencing context, by contrast, the conservative risk algorithm can be
used to increase the severity of the terms of punishment. The cost of an erroneous
false positive prediction is even greater: the defendant who is actuarially indi-
cated as likely to reoffend, but who in fact never will, may be incarcerated rather
260. Latessa & Lovins, supra note 30, at 212-13.
261. Id. at 213.
262. See Hannah-Moffat, supra note 38, at 276 (noting that individuals who score a high risk level
will be sentenced to "custodial sentences and/or a greater number of conditions attached to the
disposition," which makes these individuals "more vulnerable to breach, increased surveillance, and
further criminalization").
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than sentenced to probation, or be incarcerated for a greater period of time in the
name of public safety.
This significant, yet unquantifiable, cost remains largely invisible: we do not
and cannot know who has been incarcerated unnecessarily. Such costs also remain
invisible in the literature that praises actuarial sentencing, which compares the fi-
nancial cost of unnecessarily incarcerating someone against the possibility of
future criminal activity. For example, when the Pennsylvania Commission on
Sentencing's Risk/Needs Assessment Project considered the issue of false posi-
tives and negatives, it articulated the possible "tradeoffs" as follows: "Is it better
to err on the side of over predicting arrest [which potentially could result in correc-
tional overcrowding] or under predicting arrest [which potentially could result in
more crime] [?] How much better? That is, how many false positives equal one
false negative [or vice versa] ?, 263
When framed as a tradeoff between the unnecessary expenditure of money
compared to a risk to public safety, the answer seems simple: public safety should
win. The cost of not following the risk prediction, it follows, is that the public
will be victimized. This simplistic balancing of the public safety against financial
resources is common throughout laudatory actuarial sentencing literature.264
This equation overlooks altogether the immense humanistic costs to the indi-
vidual who is inaccurately identified as presenting a high risk of recidivism and
is accordingly incapacitated. These costs include the experience of brutal, dan-
gerous conditions, 265 the severance of family and community ties, 266 and often
insurmoubtable obstacles to re-entering society upon release.26 ' It also ignores
literature demonstrating that prison itself can be crimonogenic, or crime-
268causing.
Structural and institutional influences encourage judges to err on the side of cau-
tion and follow these conservative estimates, despite the possibility of a false posi-
tive. Indeed, if a court ignores a prediction that a defendant is "high-risk" and that
person re-offends, "blame will accrue to the original sentencer. ' 269 An "error" in
the other direction-unnecessarily incarcerating an individual or extending the
263. PA. COMM'N ON SENTENCING RISK/NEEDS ASSESSMENT PROJECT, INTERIM REPORT 5: DEVELOPING
CATEGORIES OF RISK 15 (2012), http://www.hominid.psu.edu/specialty-programs/pacs/publications-and-
research/research-and-evaluation-reports/risk- assessment/phase-i-reports/interim-report-5 -developing-
categories-of-risk/view [https://perma.cc/8AEY-BDTD].
264. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
265. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 515 (2005) ("Prisons are dangerous places .... ). See
generally Martin H. Pritikin, Is Prison Increasing Crime?, 2008 WIs. L. REv. 1049, 1056-57
(describing the "brutalization effect of prison").
266. See Pritikin, supra note 265, at 1055-56.
267. Id. at 1060-64.
268. See Todd R. Clear, Backfire: When Incarceration Increases Crime, in THE UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES OF INCARCERATION (1996), https://www.vera.org/publications/the-unintended-consequences-
of-incarceration-papers-from-a-conference-organized-by-vera [https://perma.cc/RDN8-8UWC] (identifying
three "crime-enhancing" effects of imprisonment); see also Pritikin, supra note 265, at 1052 ("There is a
growing body of literature discussing the ways in which incarceration may unintentionally increase crime.").
269. ROBERTS, supra note 34, at 23.
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term of her sentence-does not carry this risk. Thus, risk assessment information
may encourage "decisions in which a sentence is imposed to prevent a crime that
would in fact not have been committed.
270
Thus, for the foregoing reasons, actuarial sentencing could lead to more, not
less, reliance on incarceration. This possibility provides reason to question
whether actuarial sentencing will provide the financial savings its proponents
promise. And for the reasons explored below, the analysis itself is missing a num-
ber of costs that, when factored into the equation, militate against the adoption of
actuarial sentencing.
B. IDENTIFYING "OFF-LABEL" COSTS
Actuarial sentencing is in its nascency, and existing scholarship has yet to deter-
mine whether actuarial sentencing can or will meaningfully reduce consumption
of incarceratory resources. Indeed, for the reasons just discussed, the practice can
justify incarcerating many offenders, which may counterbalance any cost savings
resulting from the diversion and rehabilitation of others. The focus on fiscal incen-
tives has led many actuarial sentencing proponents and risk researchers to strive to
refine the risk prediction analysis to enhance its accuracy-to get the prediction
"right" more often to maximize savings.
This section contends that, even if widespread adoption of this practice can
lead to a net financial gain, these savings are not costless-they will be realized
at the expense of principles of equity and justice that motivate and legitimize our
criminal justice system. Regardless of how accurately the tools predict recidi-
vism, the risk inquiry these tools advance is anathema to a principled, constitu-
tional, and just sentencing inquiry. Indeed, there is a significant fissure between
principles restricting how risk is measured at sentencing and how risk is measured
in actuarial sentencing.
A fundamental tenet of sentencing law and policy is that "[o]ur law punishes
people for what they do, not who they are. ' 271 Two principles that flow from this
premise inform the interaction between risk prediction and sentencing. The first
is a negative rule against punishing people for "who they are": when predicting
whether a defendant poses a danger to public safety that justifies extending a sen-
tence, the sentencing court should not consider non-culpable characteristics.
The Supreme Court recently affirmed this principle in Buck v. Davis.2 7 2 Mr.
Buck was convicted of capital murder. At the sentencing phase, the jury heard
expert testimony that an individual's race was statistically correlated with "pro-
pensity for violence," and that Mr. Buck was "statistically more likely to act vio-
lently because he is black. ' 273 After hearing this testimony, the jury sentenced
him to death.2 74 The Court summarized the testimony as suggesting that "the
270. Id.
271. Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 778 (2017).
272. Id.
273. Id. at 767.
274. Id.
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color of [Mr.] Buck's skin made him more deserving of execution," 2 and ulti-
mately ruled that it was reversible error for the jury to make a "predictive judg-
ment" about Mr. Buck's future conduct based on "hard statistical evidence" that
his race increased the likelihood of future violent conduct. 2"76 The Court specified
that "[i]t would be patently unconstitutional for a state to argue that a defendant is
liable to be a future danger because of his race. 277 In so doing, the Court drew a
clear line prohibiting "[d]ispensing punishment on the basis of an immutable
characteristic" such as race.278
Honoring this proscription against punishing someone for "who they are" logi-
cally and ethically precludes consideration of characteristics that are perhaps
mutable or volitional but nevertheless non-culpable. Indeed, as Micheal Tonry
recently argued, "[i]t ought to be platitudinous and anachronistic to write that
there is something fundamentally unethical or immoral about apportioning pun-
ishments or other intrusions on liberty on the basis of ascribed characteristics
for which no coherent argument can be made that offenders bear personal respon-
sibility for them. ' 279 Thus, the Court has specified that consideration of non-
culpable associational characteristics, including religion and political affiliation,
is both "constitutionally impermissible" and "totally irrelevant to the sentencing
process. '280 And the Sentencing Reform Act requires that the federal Sentencing
Guidelines be "entirely neutral" not only as to defendants' "race, sex, [and]
national origin," but also as to their "creed" and "socioeconomic status. '281 The
Act also stresses that it is "general[ly] inappropriate[]" to consider other non-
culpable personal characteristics at sentencing, such as education, vocational
skills, and employment record.282
The second guiding principle is the positive converse of the first: to justify
enhancing or extending punishment because of the risk of future conduct, the risk
inquiry should consider only volitional culpable conduct ("what they do"). There
are two potential sources of volitional culpable conduct: the crime of conviction
and the defendant's criminal history. Logically, the former-the very reason for
the imposition of punishment-should at least factor into, if not predominate, the
sentencing risk inquiry. The conviction of a crime is a necessary precondition to
punishment;283 it is the event that separates criminal punishment from preventive
275. Id. at 775.
276. Id. at 776.
277. Id. at 775. The specific constitutional issue presented to the Court was whether Mr. Buck's
defense attorney was ineffective for soliciting this information from the expert.
278. Id. at 778.
279. Tonry, supra note 135, at 171.
280. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983).
281. 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2012).
282. Id. § 994(e).
283. See Christopher Slobogin, The Civilization of the Criminal Law, 58 VAND. L. REv. 121, 131
(2005) ("By definition, we cannot punish someone unless he has committed a crime, or at least we say
he has committed one."); see also Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive
Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REv. 1429, 1432 (2001) ("[P]unishment can only exist in
relation to a past wrong.").
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detention mechanisms, such as sexual predator laws.28 4 Even those utilitarian the-
ories that justify punishment in terms of public safety gains cannot justify incar-
cerating someone who has not been convicted of a crime, regardless of the public
safety gains to be had from penal intervention."8'
It is also common practice to integrate the defendant's past criminal behavior
into a prediction about her future conduct. An offender's criminal history is sec-
ond in importance in sentencing decisions only to the severity of the offense of
conviction.28 6 This "recidivist sentencing premium," or the notion that punish-
ment for a criminal offense should increase progressively along with the
offender's criminal history, dates back to at least the 1600s, 287 and grew in promi-
nence with rise of recidivist enhancement statutes in the 1980s.2"' Recidivist
enhancement statutes, such as "three strikes" laws, permit or require an increase-
often a dramatic increase-in an individual's sentence because of his or her prior
criminal history.28 9
Recidivist enhancement statutes are themselves a form of "rough actuarial-
ism."'2 9 They start from the premise that past criminal behavior predicts future
criminal behavior,29 1 and use this presumption to justify increasing a sentence
in the name of crime prevention.29 2 The role of criminal history in sentencing
in general, and recidivist enhancement statutes in particular, have recently met
with circumspection as scholars and practitioners have begun to recognize that
criminal history may be more reflective of the biased application of discretion-
ary policies and practices of criminal justice agents than any innate criminal
284. Robinson, supra note 283, at 1432. Punishment and prevention are fundamentally different;
they rely on different criteria and call for different procedures. Punishment, especially through
imprisonment, happily produces a beneficial collateral effect of incapacitation. If preventive detention is
needed beyond the prison term of deserved punishment, it ought to be provided by a system that is open
about its preventive purpose and is specifically designed to perform that function. Id.
285. See Markus Dirk Dubber, Note, The Unprincipled Punishment of Repeat Offenders: A Critique
of California's Habitual Criminal Statute, 43 STAN. L. REV. 193, 216 (1990) (explaining that "[m]odern
advocates of incapacitation theory" would "distance themselves" from the "absurd" policy of allowing
punishment without conviction).
286. ROBERTS, supra note 34, at 2, 11-12 (identifying an offender's criminal record as "the second
most important sentencing factor," and one that is used "around the world"); see also Hessick &
Hessick, supra note 238, at 71-72 (noting that consideration of the possibility of future criminal activity
is one of the most common sentencing enhancements).
287. ROBERTS, supra note 34, at 3-5. Roberts observes that the interest in identifying recidivist
offenders was so great it justified branding people convicted of offenses. Id. at 6.
288. Id. at 18-19.
289. See id. at 20-21 (describing "three strikes" statutes).
290. Simon, supra note 57, at 407.
291. Julian V. Roberts, The Role of Criminal Record in the Sentencing Process, 22 CRIME & JUST.
303, 316 (1997) ("For the utilitarian purposes of special deterrence and incapacitation, the link between
past and future offending is unambiguous: previous criminal conduct is predictive of future
offending."); see also Fletcher, supra note 202, at 55 (utilitarians contend that those who have done
wrong once are "likely to do so in the future").
292. ROBERTS, supra note 34, at 15 ("Historically, the [recidivist sentencing] premium has been
justified by reference to prevention.").
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propensity. 293 But at the very least, this practice, even if not advisable as a matter
of policy, does not violate the proscription against punishing someone for any-
thing other than volitional culpable conduct.
Thus, to justify increasing the severity of a sentence based on the risk of
future conduct, a court should not consider personal characteristics and should
only consider culpable, volitional conduct. A primary marketing promise of
actuarial sentencing is that it simply refines, but does not fundamentally
change, the sentencing risk inquiry. Counterintuitively, however, actuarial sen-
tencing actually expands and distorts these two sentencing risk principles.
First, it expands the way risk is measured by incorporating into the risk predic-
tion a range of factors that are purportedly anathema to a valid and just sentencing
inquiry; the incorporation of these factors violates the proscription against pun-
ishing someone for "who they are. '294 As noted above, using criminal history to
predict future activity is itself a contested and concerning practice. 295 Equally
troubling, however, is the way these tools explicitly incorporate additional factors
into the prediction inquiry. Some of these "plus" factors are "static" and cannot
be changed through criminal justice intervention, such as gender; other plus fac-
tors are "dynamic," or changeable, such as employment status or education
level. 29 6 Importantly, however, all are non-culpable, and many have been identi-
fied as patently irrelevant to sentencing 29 7 or "general[ly] inappropriate[]" to a
just sentencing inquiry. 29 8
Jurisdictions have been careful to exclude from their actuarial calculations the
most provocative and constitutionally suspect consideration: race.299 For example,
in preparation for statewide adoption of actuarial sentencing, the Pennsylvania
Sentencing Commission conducted a series of studies to identify factors that
should be incorporated into the state's sentencing risk assessment tool.30 0 In the
first round of studies, the working group found that race and county were highly
correlated with likelihood of recidivism: African Americans and individuals from
293. See John Monahan, Risk Assessment in Sentencing, in 4 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PUNISHMENT, INCARCERATION, AND RELEASE, supra note 248, at 77, 88 ("A record of prior criminal
arrests and convictions can reflect the differential involvement of the members of given groups in
criminal behavior, and it can also reflect the differential selection of the members of given groups by
police to arrest, by prosecutors to indict, and by judges and juries to convict.").
294. Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 778 (2017).
295. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
297. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2012) (listing gender).
298. See id. § 994(e) (listing education level, employment status, and history).
299. See Scurich & Monahan, supra note 120, at 37 ("No risk assessment instrument explicitly
includes race as a risk factor in sentencing.").
300. See generally PA. COMM'N ON SENTENCING RIsK/NEEDS ASSESSMENT PROJECT, INTERIM REPORT 3:
FACTORS THAT PREDICT RECIDIVISM FOR VARIOUS TYPES OF OFFENDERS 2 (2011), http://pcs.la.psu.edu/
publications-and-research/research-and-evaluation-reports/risk-assessment/phase-i-reports/interim-report- 3-
factors -that-predict-recidivism-for-various -types -of-offenders/view [https://perma.cc/GS3J-QU8G]
(describing the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing's Risk Assessment Project).
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urban counties were found to present a higher risk of recidivism.0 1 In future stud-
ies, however, the group omitted race and county as factors.30 2
Nevertheless, as scholars have noted, some of the seemingly less suspect actua-
rial risk factors correlate with race so strongly that they are essentially a proxy for
this impermissible factor.30 3 In any event, simply omitting direct incorporation of
race into the assessment leaves a number of personal, non-culpable characteris-
tics, such as gender, age, and educational history, within the actuarial equation.
Proponents justify this consideration of seemingly troubling characteristics by
reference to their utility in increasing the accuracy of the actuarial prediction. For
example, in defending the explicit consideration of gender in the COMPAS risk
assessment tool used in Loomis, the State of Wisconsin argued that such consider-
ation is "necessary to achieve statistical accuracy .... [B]ecause men and women
have different rates of recidivism and different rehabilitation potential, a gender
neutral risk assessment would provide inaccurate results for both men and
women."30 4 The Wisconsin Supreme Court found this argument compelling and
held that the incorporation of gender into the sentencing risk assessment "pro-
motes accuracy that ultimately inures to the benefit of the justice system includ-
ing defendants.""3 Others reason that actuarial consideration of these factors is
better than the alternative scenario, in which judges would make these predictions
based on potentially biased intuition.30 6 In short, they contend that actuarial tools
301. Id. at 1.
302. See PA. COMM'N ON SENTENCING RISK/NEEDS ASSESSMENT PROJECT, PHASE II, INTERIM REPORT
1: DEVELOPMENT OF A RISK ASSESSMENT SCALE BY OFFENSE GRAVITY SCORE FOR ALL OFFENDERS 11 n.5
(2015), http://pcs.la.psu.edu/publications -and-research/research-and-evaluation-reports/fisk-assessment/
phase-ii-reports/Interim-Rpt-l-Phase-2/view [https://perma.cc/BFM2-KEZD] ("While race was found to
be a significant predictor of recidivism, it is not included in the risk scale. It was a factor, however,
controlled for in the analyses."); see also PA. COMM'N ON SENTENCING RISK/NEEDS ASSESSMENT PROJECT,
PHASE II, INTERIM REPORT 2: VALIDATION OF A RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT BY OFFENSE GRAVITY
SCORE FOR ALL OFFENDERS 12 n.8 (2016), http://pcs.la.psu.edu/publications-and-research/research-
and-evaluation-reports/risk-assessment/phase-ii-reports/interim-report-2-validation- of-risk-assessment-
instrument-by-ogs-for-all-offenses-february-2016/view [https://perma.cc/RZR5-8CCW] ("While race
and county were found to be significant predictors of recidivism, they are not included in the risk
scale. They are, however, statistically controlled for in the analyses, which means that the effects of
the other factors are included only after eliminating the effects of race and county.").
303. See Scurich & Monahan, supra note 120, at 37 (noting the "widespread belief that many risk
factors that can be found on actuarial risk assessment instruments used in sentencing serve as close
proxies for race"); see, e.g., Oleson, supra note 4, at 1386-87 ("[A]ctuarial sentencing builds upon a
statistical association between variables (such as race) and crime to predict recidivism. These
predictions may justify-at least in part-the imposition of disparate criminal sentences based on a
number of variables correlated with risk, including race.").
304. State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 765 (Wis. 2016). See generally Hannah-Moffat, supra note
38, at 283-84 (noting that "eliminating problematic variables and those associated with protected
categories (i.e. race and gender) from risk assessment instruments compromises the predictive power of
these instruments"); Oleson, supra note 4, at 1337 ("Such problematic items can be eliminated from risk
assessment instruments, but as the variables associated with protected categories are struck from
assessment tools, the predictive power of these instruments wanes.").
305. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 767.
306. See, e.g., Joe Palazzolo, Judges Turn to Risk-Evaluation Tools in Sentencing Decisions, WALL ST.
J., (Sept. 23, 2014, 6:30 PM) https://www.wsj.com/articles/judges-turn-to-risk-evaluation-tools-in-
sentencing-decisions-1411499848 [https://perma.cc/A4HH-VDV8] ("Christopher Slobogin, a Vanderbilt
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help the sentencing judge give appropriate weight to factors such as gender; with-
out these tools, judges would give a factor like gender either too much or too little
consideration." 7
That including these characteristics may increase the accuracy of the predic-
tion, however, does not make the practice just. The appropriate weight to be given
to non-culpable characteristics is, quite simply, no weight at all.30 8 Regardless of
accuracy gains or losses, this practice embraces the procedure rejected in Buck: it
incorporates purportedly "hard statistical evidence," gleaned from an array of the
defendant's personal characteristics-some of which are immutable and most of
which are non-culpable-to make a predictive judgment about the defendant's
future conduct.30 9 In other words, it endorses a system that punishes people for
"who they are."31
Actuarial sentencing also violates the second sentencing principle: that we
punish people for "what they do." '3 11 Indeed, actuarial risk assessment tools mea-
sure risk in a way that is unmoored from criminal culpability. Although actuarial
risk instruments incorporate a range of non-culpable characteristics into their cal-
culations, most of the tools omit one seemingly crucial factor: the crime for which
the defendant is being punished.3 12 Somewhat surprisingly, the crime of convic-
tion does not statistically correlate with recidivism.3 13 In fact, some studies have
found a "non-intuitive" correlation between the severity of the crime of convic-
tion and recidivism: the more serious the offense, the lower the risk of recidi-
vism.314 For example, a recent Bureau of Justice Statistics study indicated that
violent offenders were less likely to recidivate within five years of their release
from prison than property, drug, or public order offenders.31 5 It is unsurprising,
therefore, that many actuarial risk assessment tools do not factor it into their
University law professor, said the alternative was potentially worse. 'At least these risk-assessment
instruments don't explicitly focus on race or poverty, unlike what might occur in a sentencing regime
where judges are making risk assessments based on seat-of-the-pants evaluations,' he said."); see also
Monahan, supra note 291, at 85 (arguing that risk assessment is better at addressing racial or
socioeconomic disparities in sentencing compared to "judicial hunch" or heavy reliance on criminal
history).
307. And one scholar has justified the consideration of immutable characteristics to determine a
sentence as a sort of "moral luck." Oleson, supra note 4, at 1389-90. As one scholar has noted, there is a
"surreal quality" to the literature's "mostly untroubled embrace" of incorporating gender into the risk
algorithm. Starr, supra note 1, at 825.
308. See supra notes 279-82 and accompanying text.
309. Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 776 (2017).
310. Id. at 778.
311. Id.
312. See Starr, supra note 1, at 811.
313. Id.
314. MATTHEW DEMICHELE & JULIA LASKORUNSKY, SENTENCING RISK ASSESSMENT: A FOLLOW-UP
STUDY OF THE OCCURRENCE AND TIMING OF RE-ARREST AMONG SERIOUS OFFENDERS IN PENNSYLVANIA
35 (2014), http://justicecenter.psu.edu/research/projects/files/PCS%20-Risk%20Assessment-Tool.pdf
(finding "that a more serious offense is associated with lower recidivism").
315. Matthew R. Durose et al., Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 30 States in 2005: Patterns from
2005 to 2010-Update, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS. (Apr. 2014), https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=
pbdetail&iid=4986 [https://perma.cc/2S5Q-DMXY].
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predictive algorithms.316 Such a prediction of future behavior, which calibrates
punishment based on factors having nothing to do with the crime of conviction,
undermines the principle that we punish for "what they do," and perhaps even
justifies imposing or enhancing a punishment purely to prevent future crimes.3 17
Thus, even if actuarial sentencing helps judges more accurately identify those
who are likely to recidivate, it can also justify punishing someone more severely
for reasons that are divorced from traditional punishment principles. Under an
actuarial sentencing regime, individuals may be incarcerated, or incarcerated for
longer, only because-based on an assessment of their personal, non-culpable
characteristics-they are purportedly more likely to reoffend. This consideration
of non-culpable, personal characteristics to predict future behavior calls into
question the propriety of using actuarial risk prediction for any purpose and at
any stage in the criminal justice system.
Perhaps the shortcomings of actuarial recidivism predictions are somewhat tol-
erable, even if not advisable, when the predictive tools are used for their on-label
use-that is, when used to "correct risk." A key shortcoming of actuarial risk pre-
diction is that it defines recidivism broadly as "probability of reoffending,"31 8
which may be measured by the likelihood of being convicted or arrested for any
offense and predicts risk without reference to the instant crime. If the purpose of
recidivism risk identification is to reduce that risk over the term of correctional
control, it may make sense to assess risk independent of culpability. The goal is
to reduce the likelihood the defendant will return to the system for any reason,
regardless of the severity of the preceeding or subsequent offense. As the crime
of conviction is not predictive of recidivism, it is irrelevant to this inquiry.31 9
Presumably the treatment or intervention points would be the same, regardless of
the type of offense the offender is likely to commit: targeting antisocial attitudes,
substance abuse, and other dynamic risk factors.
Furthermore, if the goal is to "correct risk" by reducing recidivism through cor-
rectional intervention, it may be acceptable to take into account certain personal,
non-culpable characteristics such as gender and educational or employment his-
tory. Key components of the Risk-Needs-Responsivity principle are to identify
and target interventions toward the defendant's dynamic characteristics, and to
deliver such treatment or programming in a way that is the most responsive to his
316. Starr, supra note 1, at 811 (noting that "almost none" of the evidence-based sentencing
instruments "include the crime for which the defendant was convicted in the case at hand").
317. See, e.g., State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 764 (2016) ("[A]n offender who is young,
unemployed, has an early age-at-first-arrest, and a history of supervision failure, will score medium or high
on the Violence Risk Scale even though the offender never had a violent offense." (quoting Electronic
Case Reference Manual, COMPAS Assessment Frequently Asked Questions, Wis. DEP'T OF CORRS.
https://doc.helpdocsonline.com/dcc-business-process [https://perma.cc/H845-94GZ] (last visited Aug. 11,
2018))).
318. Latessa & Lovins, supra note 30, at 206.
319. As Latessa and Lovins explain, "though a felon has been convicted of a more serious offense
than a misdemeanant, their relative risk of reoffending may have nothing to do with the seriousness of
the crime." Id. at 205-06.
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particular needs and learning styles. For example, as Michael Tonry explains,
" [i]t would make little sense not to take educational credentials and existing work
experience and skills into account in assignment to educational or vocational pro-
grams. 3"0 Moreover, there is growing attention to the ways in which differences
of culture, gender, and other static characteristics impact the efficacy of rehabili-
tative efforts.321 Even if these characteristics cannot be changed through correc-
tional intervention, perhaps it may be necessary to consider them in order to
direct an individual toward correctional programming that is gender-responsive,
culturally compentent, or otherwise tailored to that person's rehabilitative needs.
However, when used to "sentence risk" as opposed to merely "correct risk,"
actuarial risk assessment imposes a systemic consequence that cannot be coun-
tenanced: the possibility that we will punish someone more severely for non-
culpable, personal characteristics. As Professor Starr has persuasively argued,
actuarial sentencing presents concerns of constitutional proportions.322 Specifically,
she contends that the incorporation of gender and wealth-related classifications
(such as employment status, education, and dependence on government assistance)
into the sentencing risk algorithm should not pass scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause, and raises due process concerns.3
23
Even if this practice withstands constitutional scrutiny, it is nevertheless mis-
guided. It distorts the RNR principle that underlies and legitimizes actuarial risk
prediction, and justifies considering non-culpable characteristics. The RNR prin-
ciple, as developed in the correctional context, dictates that we should invest
more rehabilitative resources in high-risk offenders. In the sentencing context,
however, this principle is upended. Actuarial sentencing stratifies the risk inquiry.
Risk is identified not to craft a rehabilitative program, but rather to determine
how that risk will be mitigated: through rehabilitation if the individual is suffi-
ciently low-risk, or incapacitation if the offender is high-risk. In other words, an
individual's risk level is not used to determine how she will be rehabilitated, but
rather to determine the theory of punishment that should be followed. In light of
this distinction between correctional and sentencing purposes, it follows that we
must be even more circumspect of the inputs and outputs of the actuarial risk pre-
diction inquiry.
In addition to these doctrinal and constitutional concerns, there is an additional
equitable cost: its impact will not be fairly or evenly distributed amongst the pop-
ulation of criminal defendants. The laudatory account of actuarial sentencing
focuses on its beneficiaries: the public, which saves money without compromis-
ing public safety, and those defendants who will be diverted from prison or serve
320. Tonry, supra note 135, at 171.
321. See, e.g., BARBARA BLOOM ET AL., NAT'L INST. OF CORRS., GENDER-RESPONSIVE STRATEGIES:
RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR WOMEN OFFENDERS (2003).
322. See Starr, supra note 1, at 821-36.
323. See id.
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shorter sentences because they are sufficiently low-risk.324 To fully assess the
impact of actuarial sentencing, however, we must account for a question that is
largely overlooked by those who support this practice: how will this benefit be
distributed?3 2. More precisely, who will be disadvantaged? Who will be deemed
"risky," and why?
The answers to these questions are easy to predict. Recidivism risk factors are
markers of structural disadvantage. An individual can quickly rack up recidivism
risk points under some risk tools because they lack educational achievement or
established work history, and come from a neighborhood that has a high crime
rate. They also can be "risky" because they have had prior interactions with law
enforcement. Indeed, "criminal history" itself may be as consistent with living in
a heavily policed neighborhood as it is with any sort of criminal proclivity.
In fact, actuarial sentencing replicates and amplifies the troubling dynamics of
criminal history. Importantly, actuarial risk information supplements, but does
not replace, other information provided to the judge in advance of sentencing.
Thus, the sentencing judge in an actuarial sentencing jurisdiction receives both
details regarding the defendant's criminal history and her actuarial recidivism
risk prediction, which itself is based on that same criminal history. Defendants
with a criminal history are thus doubly disadvantaged. The sentencing judge may
consider criminal history directly for whatever sentencing purpose she sees fit-
as evidence the defendant is dangerous, requires greater specific deterrence, is ill-
suited for diversion, or is deserving of a longer sentence-and may then consider
it indirectly, as a predictive indicator of the defendant's future behavior.
Thus, the actuarial risk factors amplify and replicate the existing dynamics
within the criminal justice system. Those who stand to lose the most, therefore,
are those who are already disproportionately represented therein: young men of
color from urban neighborhoods.326
C. REASSESSING ACTUARIAL SENTENCING
Proponents of neorehabilitative reforms in general, and actuarial sentencing in
particular, characterize such measures as a movement away from the harsh, inca-
pacitative policies of the past.327 But the foregoing analysis reveals an artifact of
this revival of rehabilitation: the selective re-entrenchment of incapacitation.
Indeed, by default, those whom data do not select for rehabilitation through
problem-solving court participation, community-based sentences, or drug treat-
ment in lieu of incarceration are left to established criminal justice practices and
324. Id. at 816 (noting that advocates of actuarial sentencing "argue, or assume, that the prediction
instruments will primarily allow judges to identify low-risk offenders whose sentences can be reduced,
not high-risk offenders whose sentences must be increased").
325. See, e.g., id. at 819 (noting that the current actuarial sentencing literature's "treatment of the
disparity concern is surprisingly limited; the commentary to the MPC revision, for instance, barely
mentions it").
326. See Oleson, supra note 4, at 1387 ("[E]vidence-based sentencing has the potential to reify,
rather than ameliorate, extant racial disparities.").
327. See supra Section B.1.
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institutions. Thus, in this way, neorehabilitative reforms may help sustain a bro-
ken system indefinitely. 328
This dynamic is both more visible and perhaps even more troubling in actuarial
sentencing. Although actuarial sentencing uses data as a basis for imposing more
lenient sentences for those who pose a sufficiently low risk of recidivism, it
authorizes resort to incapacitation in the name of public safety for others. The
process by which it imposes these sentences distorts traditional sentencing princi-
ples, by authorizing and encouraging the consideration of non-culpable and per-
sonal characteristics to predict future behavior. The incorporation of actuarial,
data-based predictions can justify the imposition of a longer or more severe sen-
tence than defendants would otherwise receive. The problem is not just that indi-
viduals who pose too great a risk of recidivism are incapacitated, but that such
individuals may be incapacitated because of "who they are," rather than "what
they did. 329
In short, actuarial sentencing authorizes sentencing decisions that are unfair
and unprincipled. The problem with actuarial sentencing is not just that it can
lead to more severe outcomes for some people-the problem is with the inquiry
itself. Actuarial risk tools measure and define risk in a way that does not comport
with sentencing principles; they do not measure what should count in a just sen-
tencing inquiry.
Some actuarial sentencing proponents have suggested that we restrict the prac-
tice only to those uses that appear to benefit defendants, by using actuarial risk in-
formation only to decrease sentencing exposure or militate in favor of a
community-based sentence.330 Others have recommended that we use actuarial
sentencing as a way to actualize a limiting retributive sentiment-to sequence the
sentencing inquiries so that the judge determines the range of sentences that are
"not undeserved," and then consults actuarial risk information to determine the
particular sentence to impose within that range.331
These suggestions may mitigate some of the unfairness that can result from
actuarial sentencing, but they are nevertheless unavailing. Those who benefit
from these decisions are benefiting because of "who they are." They benefit
because they come from a background of relative privilege and were afforded
access to educational and employment opportunities, a low-crime zip code, and
perhaps even the privilege of committing low-level, quality-of-life criminal vio-
lations that were brought to the attention of law enforcement authorities.332
Conversely, those who do not benefit from such an approach-those who are not
328. See Collins, supra note 97, at 1507-08.
329. See supra notes 308-17 and accompanying text.
330. See, e.g., Starr, supra note 1, at 839-40 (noting that some actuarial sentencing proponents
"propose that it should be used only to mitigate sentences" and providing citations).
331. See, e.g., Monahan & Skeem, supra note 34, at 502.
332. For example, as Michelle Alexander has highlighted, "[t]he drug war has been waged almost
exclusively in poor communities of color, despite the fact that studies consistently indicate that people
of all races use and sell drugs at remarkably similar rates." Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 9
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7, 13 (2011).
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selected for diversionary treatment or lower sentences-are excluded because
they lack such privilege. In other words, although such an approach may be char-
acterized as simply letting some (but not all) benefit, it may also be characterized
as leaving most (but not all) subject to the dysfunction and discrimination of the
established system.
CONCLUSION
We are at a critical juncture in criminal justice reform. There is widespread
consensus that we must move away from the tough-on-crime polices that contrib-
uted to an era of mass incarceration, and there is a growing assumption that data
should lead the way.333 Meanwhile, history is threatening to repeat itself as top
criminal justice policymakers are beginning to call for a revival of the war on
crime." '
This unique posture demands that now, more than ever, we carefully scrutinize
how data is incorporated into criminal justice decisions, with particular attention
to how we label people as "risky," and the consequences of that label. In short,
we must scrutinize how we punish risk. The foregoing demonstrates what can
happen when that scrutiny is lacking: we may end up with more-not less-
incarceration, and for reasons that defy the very principles that legitimate and mo-
tivate our criminal justice system.
333. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
334. See, e.g., Memorandum from Jeff Sessions, Att'y Gen., to Fed. Prosecutors (May 10, 2017)
(instructing prosecutors to "charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable offense").
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